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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON THE HOUSING MARKET AND FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIES
by
Majid Haghani Rizi
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2018
Under the Supervision of Professor Kundan Kishor
My dissertation utilizes the valuable information present in forward looking financial
intermediaries and effects of the housing market on macroeconomy. In the second chapter,
I study the dynamic relationship in the shadow banking system. Particularly, I investigate
the short-run and the long-run relationship among the financial assets of the money market
funds, the commercial paper, and the repurchase agreement markets by undertaking a co-
integration analysis of quarterly data over the 1985-2013 period. The evidence suggests
that there exists a common long-term cointegrating trend among these three components
of the shadow banking system. Any disequilibrium in this long-run relationship among
these variables is corrected by movement in the financial assets of the money market
funds. The Beveridge-Nelson decomposition from the estimated cointegrating relationship
shows that the cyclical component in the money market funds is large and captures the
huge swings in these markets during the financial crisis. My results are also robust to the
exclusion of the financial crisis, and it reveals the changing role of the commercial paper
and the repurchase agreement market in the shadow banking system.
The third chapter of my dissertation examines the impact of housing price shocks on
tradable and non-tradable employment in the U.S. states over 2001-2014 period. For this
purpose, I use a multivariate structural VAR model with agnostic identification as proposed
ii
by Uhlig (2005). This method imposes sign restrictions on some variables in the VAR
system but does not restrict the response of employment. I find significant response of
employment to house price shocks, with non-tradable employment being more responsive
than tradable employment on average. My findings also suggest that the employment
response to house price shock is very persistent across states. There is also significant
heterogeneity in the persistence as well as the magnitude of response across different
states with states with most volatile housing market responding more to the house price
shocks.
In the fourth chapter, I apply the present value model to explain the movements in
house price-income ratio in OECD countries over the period 1975-2015. Using state-
space model, we decompose the movements in price-income ratio into expected housing
return and expected income growth since price-income ratio is a forward looking variable.
The evidence suggests that both expected income growth and expected housing price
growth are significant in explaining movements in the price-income ratio, while there is a
heterogeneity among all countries. I find a positive correlation between expected income
growth and expected housing returns. The variance decomposition of the present value
of price-income ratios shows that the most variation in the present-value component is
explained in the housing return.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the unique features of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 was the central role played
by the financial intermediaries in both causing and exacerbating the great recession. In
the financial markets, the shadow banking system is positioned similar to the traditional
banking, but with some significant differences. Over time, the size of the shadow banking
system has become comparable to the traditional banks in the U.S financial system. When
subprime mortgages faced a big negative shock due to a sharp plunge in the housing
market before the financial crisis, there were significant defaults in the short-term debt
market which were linked to the subprime mortgages. The significant increase in the
financial market risks also coincided with a run in the shadow banking system. Also, there
is a consensus about the role of the housing market in causing and exacerbating the recent
financial crisis. The financial crisis of 2008-2009 renewed the interest of policymakers and
researchers in the dynamic relationship between the housing market and macroeconomy.
My dissertation looks at financial intermediaries as well as the impact of housing markets
on macroeconomics.
In the second chapter, I examine the long-run and the short-run relationship among
these markets by using a time-series econometric approach. My results show that the
money market funds, the commercial paper and the repo markets move together in the
long-run. Further, any deviation in the shared long-run equilibrium forces the money
market funds to error-correct to restore the equilibrium relationship on this long-run path.
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This provides some rationale for the simultaneous growth of the commercial papers and
the repo market with the growing balance sheet of the money market funds. Further, my
results from the trend-cycle decomposition show that the cycle of the money market funds
is relatively greater than the cyclical component of the other two variables. This supports
the results from the error correction model.
The third chapter of my dissertation examines the effect of housing prices on
employment by using time-series data on 45 U.S. states over the sample period 2001-2015.
I also examine whether there is a differential impact of housing prices on non-tradable
employment as compared to the tradable employment. To do so, I use a multivariate
structural VAR model with sign restrictions. I assume that a positive shock to housing
prices does not lead to a decline in income and building permits and an increase in
non-performing loans for 12 months while I keep the response of employment to the
housing price shock unrestricted. My results show significant response of employment
to the housing price shock with a hump-shaped response for most of the states. There
is significant heterogeneity, however, in the magnitude of responses. On average I find
that states with higher volatility in housing prices have higher response of non-tradable
employment to the housing price shock. I also find that states with higher correlation
between consumption cycle and housing price cycles are also the states with relatively
higher response of non-tradable employment as compared to the tradable employment.
In the fourth chapter, I use the present value model to explain the movements in house
price-income ratio in OECD countries over the period 1975-2015. By using the state space
model, I explained that the price-income ratio may move due to a change in expected
income and price growth, which are stationary, and the residual component, which is
non-stationary. I find that both expected income growth and expected price growth are
significant in explaining movements in the price-income ratio. In addition, I find that the
residual component that may explain the regulation and structural feature of the housing
market is also significant, while for all countries, there is a significant heterogeneity. My
findings suggest that the correlation between expected income and the residual component
is positive for all countries.
2
Chapter 2
The Dynamic Relationship Among the Money Market
Mutual Funds, the Commercial Paper Market and the Repo
Market
2.1 Introduction
One of the unique features of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 was the central role played
by the financial intermediaries in both causing and exacerbating the great recession.
Financial intermediaries are shadow banks which use short-term funds in money markets
to purchase assets with long-term maturities.1 In the financial markets, the shadow
banking system is positioned similar to the traditional banking, but with some significant
differences. Traditional banks are insured by the FDIC. They also had an exclusive access
to the Federal Reserve’s discount window during the crisis. However, the shadow banking
system is largely unregulated and not backed by a federal agency at least before the
financial crisis.2 Over time, the size of the shadow banking system has become comparable
1Assets with long-term maturities are credit card loans, residential mortgages and auto loans
(Krishnamurthy et al. (2014)).
2Given the extraordinary impact of the recent crisis, the U.S. Treasury department created a temporary
guarantee program (TGP) for Money Market Funds.
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to the traditional banks in the U.S financial system.3
In the shadow banking system, the money market funds (MMFs hereafter), the
commercial paper (CP hereafter) market and the repurchase agreement (repo hereafter)
market are the three main players. Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between the MMFs,
the CP and the repo markets as the three main funding sources for the shadow banking
system in the U.S. The MMFs are one of the biggest cash players in the shadow banking
system; the largest portion of this cash is allocated to collateralized repo and the CP market
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2014). Prior to 1970, MMFs invested mainly in the U.S Treasury
debt. However, since 1970, they became an alternative to traditional banks, and a new
source of deposits for investors as they offered slightly higher returns than the conventional
bank deposits. The significant increase in financial assets of MMFs also coincided with
the development of the CP and the repo markets. At the same time, the simultaneous
development of the CP and the repo markets facilitated the growth of the MMFs, as they
became an important source of investments for the MMFs. These two markets provided a
market for private sector debt that was considered relatively safe, flexible and paid interest
(Anderson et al., 2009).
When subprime mortgages faced a big negative shock due to a sharp plunge in the
housing market before the financial crisis, there were significant defaults in the short-term
debt market which were linked to the subprime mortgages. The significant increase in
the financial market risks also coincided with a run in the shadow banking system. As
a result, the financial assets of the MMFs decreased by a trillion dollars between 2008
to 2010. At the same time, the financial assets of the CP and the repo markets in the
same period declined by $0.7 trillion and $17 million respectively. The academic literature
also started paying attention to these financial intermediaries since the financial crisis.
See for example, Gorton and Metrick (2012), Gorton et al. (2010), and Krishnamurthy
et al. (2014) among others. However, most of these papers have provided a narrative
explanation for the causes of the crisis and the role of different markets in propagating the
crisis.
3Gorton et al. (2010) show that before the 2007-2008 financial crisis the assets of the shadow banking
system were as large as the asset of traditional banks.
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We contribute to the existing nascent literature on the MMFs, the CP, and the repo
markets by examining the dynamic relationship between these three markets over time. In
particular, we are interested in testing the anecdotal evidence about the simultaneous
development of the MMFs, the CP, and the repo markets. To do so, we examine
the existence of a long-run relationship in the financial assets of these three markets
by modeling the long-run cointegrating relationship between these three variables. To
examine which of these variables adjust to correct for the disequilibrium in the short-run,
we use a vector error correction methodology. Using the information from the long-run
cointegration model, we also decompose the movements in the financial assets of the
MMFs, the CP, and the repo markets into a trend and a cycle. This allows us to measure
the extent of movement in these variables that are permanent and transitory.
Our results show that the financial assets of the MMFs, the CP, and the repo markets
share a long-run equilibrium relationship, i.e., they are cointegrated. Any deviation from
this long-run equilibrium is corrected by the subsequent movements in at least one of
these three markets. These results shed some light on the question about the simultaneous
development of the MMFs, the CP, and the repo markets, and whether the explosive growth
in the financial assets of the MMFs also led to the development of the CP and the repo
markets. Our results suggest that though their financial assets do move together in the
long-run, it is only the MMFs that respond to any deviations, while the CP and the repo
market do not participate in the error correction process.
The results are further reinforced by the multivariate Beveridge-Nelson decomposition
where we find that the MMFs has the biggest cyclical component. This is not surprising
since it is the MMFs that move to correct for any disequilibrium in the short-run. The
estimated cycle from the cointegrating relationship also captures the huge swings in these
markets in the period around the financial crisis. Our results are robust to the exclusion
of the volatile financial crisis sample period. The evidence in the paper provides some
rationale for the simultaneous development of the CP and the repo markets with the
growing balance sheet of the MMFs, and the feedback mechanism that is present within
the shadow banking system.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: in section 1.2, we provide a
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background on the shadow banking system, MMFs, the CP, the repo markets and the
data used in the empirical analysis. Section 1.3 provides methodological issues and the
empirical evidence. Finally, the conclusions are presented in section 1.4.
2.2 Background and Data
2.2.1 The Shadow Banking System
Traditional banks (deposit banks) involve in maturity transformation where they use
deposits to fund loans that are of long-term nature. The traditional banks receive deposit
money which can be withdrawn at any time by the depositors. Further, these deposits
are guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. From the loan transactions
the banks earn interest income and the loan borrowers in turn promise to repay them.
There are three main differences between the traditional banks and the shadow banks.
First, when the shadow banks are faced with an emergency situation, such as investors
wanting to redeem, they cannot borrow from the Federal Reserve. Second, they are not
regulated like traditional banks and don’t have access to deposit insurance from the FDIC.
However, at the midst of financial crisis, the U.S. Treasury did extend support to the MMFs
through the Treasury’s Guarantee Program (TGP). While this program does act as a form
of insurance to the MMFs, the principal motive of this program is to provide a temporary
guarantee to protect the shareholders of MMFs.4 Third, the traditional banks pay for
deposit insurance and pass on a part of this cost along to the depositors.5 In contrast, in
case of the shadow banking system such insurance cost do not exist, and therefore, they
have a cost advantage over traditional banks in that sense (Gorton et al., 2010).
Pozsar et al. (2010) define shadow banks to include finance companies, asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, structured investment vehicles (SIVs), credit
4While it is true that the principle intent of such program is to temporarily safeguard the interests of
MMFs stockholders, it is not completely inconceivable for investors to expect similar treatment in the future,
often known as the problem of moral hazard.
5It is important to note that the extent to which the banks can pass on the cost of insurance to the
depositors depends on the degree of elasticity that the banks face, with the remainder of the cost borne by
the banks, like any other indirect taxes.
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hedge funds, MMFs, securities lenders, limited-purpose finance companies (LPFCs), and
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Figure 1.1 presents the shadow banking system
in the U.S. We can see that in the U.S. shadow banking system, the CP and the repo markets
appear on the asset side and MMFs on the liability side. Investors bring their money to
the shadow banking system and get shares from the MMFs or collateral from the securities
lender. On the other side, the borrowers provide financial assets and collateral to the
shadow banking system. Thus, the relationship between the lender and the borrower has
an additional layer of complexity as compared to the traditional banks.
The unraveling of the financial system during the financial crisis also led to defaults
in the short-term debt market linked to this asset class. Gorton et al. (2010) explain that
the developments in the subprime market led to the collapse of the MMFs, the CP, and the
repo markets, as well as the overall shadow banking system. As shown in Figure 1.2, the
financial assets of the MMFs, the CP, and the repo markets grew exponentially before the
financial crisis, but declined significantly during the financial crisis.
2.2.2 Money Market Funds
One of the main players in the U.S. shadow banking system is the MMFs. At the end 2013,
the MMFs managed over $2.68 trillion in assets which is 16.72 percent of all the total
mutual fund assets in the U.S., and 8.6 percent of the mutual fund assets worldwide.6
Figure 1.2 presents the time-series behavior of the MMFs from 1985 to 2013. It shows the
rapid growth in the MMFs in 1998-2008 period with only a short dip in the 2002-2005
period. While the industry has expanded and reached the peak of 3.76 trillion in October
2008, its financial assets had dropped to 2.59 trillion by the end of 2013.
Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act (1940) regulates the MMFs in the U.S.
Under this rule, the quality, maturity, and diversity of investments in the money market
fund portfolios are defined. Short-term yield, liquidity, and stability cause the MMFs to
become a pool of cash management vehicle for retail and institutional investors. Stable
6The data is collected from Investment Company Institute according to which the total financial asset of
the MMFs is $2.7 trillion, whereas the total financial assets of mutual funds in the U.S. is $16.14 trillion, and
the corresponding assets equal $31.38 trillion for the whole world.
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price per share, $1.00 per share under standard industry practice, has caused the MMFs
to become similar to bank deposits. However, unlike traditional banks, it does not
explicitly have the Federal insurance. This characteristic causes the MMFs to be a low-
risk investment asset which satisfies stability. Apart from stability, each investment should
satisfy quality, diversification, and maturity, which leads the MMFs to invest in short-term,
high credit quality, and well-diversified instruments. Under rule 2a-7, the MMFs could
have potentially curtailed the spreading of risks before the financial crisis of 2007-2008.
However, that become very limited in the stressful conditions that the markets faced in
September 2008. Lehman’s failure and uncertainty in the financial system led MMFs to
face significantly high level of outflows. The huge outflows greatly inhibited the MMF’s
ability to maintain liquidity. The liquidity stress in turn made investors to transfer their
assets from the prime MMFs to other secure funds. As a result of the stress in the market,
the MMFs were unable to maintain a stable $1.00 net asset value, which is one of the
important conditions required to prevent a run on the MMFs.
Given the importance of the MMFs, the academic literature has also started paying
attention to its role in the financial system. Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2009) study the
recent financial crisis by examining the risk-taking behavior of the MMFs. They show that
the financial crisis has revealed that the MMFs have an incentive to take on risks, and are
vulnerable to runs if the risks materialize. The MMFs which took more risks were more
prone to runs. Duygan-Bump et al. (2013) consider one of the ways to respond to these
kinds of risks. They used the difference-in-difference approach to illustrate the role of
the ABCP money market fund liquidity facility (AMLF) during the financial crisis. Their
findings highlight that the AMLF can help to stabilize asset outflows from the MMFs and
also decrease asset-backed-commercial-paper yields. Schmidt et al. (2014) study the run
on the MMFs during the period of September and October of 2008 at a daily frequency.
They emphasize that the MMFs which promised higher yields and less liquid securities
were taking more risk and faced runs. These studies show that the MMFs faced runs
which played an important role during the financial crisis.
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2.2.3 The Commercial Paper Market
The MMFs provide the biggest source of funding for the CP market. Investment in the
CP market is also consistent with the mandate of the MMFs, as it satisfies one of the
main requirements for MMFs of being a low-risk investment and has short-term maturity
horizon. In the U.S., dealers and corporations are the main issuers of the CP. The issuers
of CP finance their projects or increase their capital base and in return investors receive
interest which is the difference between the purchase price and the face value of the CP.
There are three types of investors in the CP market. Type one purchases the CP at issuance
and holds them till maturity. Type two purchases the CP to trade in secondary markets.
Type three investors prefer to purchase newly issued CP from the same issuer while their
holding of the CP matures. There is a liquidity risk for which the issuers could not refinance
maturing CP.
In the 1970s, the MMFs occupied a significant share in the overall mutual funds
industry, which in turn became a big part of investments in the CP market. Inventory in CP
led to the creation of asset-back commercial papers (ABCP). ABCP are CP which are backed
by some underlying asset. Most studies that investigate the run on the financial system
(traditional and shadow banking system) show that a shock to the financial system leads
to increased risk (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Campello et al. (2010), and Campello
et al. (2011)). Covitz et al. (2009) consider run on ABCP market by using micro-level
data. They find that the run on ABCP in 2007 is related to weaker liquidity support and
lower ratings which in turn aggravated the macro-financial risks.
Anderson et al. (2009) explain the run on the CP market during the financial crisis.
They show that the MMFs invested in the CP as they provided revenue at low risk before
the financial crisis. However, the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers caused a run on
the CP market, which in turn had adverse effects on the money market fund investments.
Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2009) explain that there are three reasons for the collapse and
run on the CP market namely, adverse selection, using other source of financing, and
the MMFs. These findings suggest that the CP and the MMFs are related to each other.
However, these studies do not explain how these two markets move together over different
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horizons, which is one of the main objectives of the current paper. While these papers
provide good insights into the interlinked runs in the CP market and the MMFs, it is also
important to recognize the potential connections with the repo market as it is another
important source of financial intermediation in the shadow banking system.
2.2.4 The Repo Market
The CP and the repo markets are two important components of the shadow banking
system, especially for the MMFs (as a main cash player in the shadow banking system).
The repo agreements (or simply repo) are a form of the short-term funding facility, as they
are simply the agreement of sale and future repurchase of a financial asset. This asset in
most cases is Treasury securities, but over time it has changed, and other short-term debt
instruments which were linked to the subprime mortgage are now a part of the financial
asset over which repo are undertaken. Cash-rich financial market players such as the
MMFs and securities lenders, lend to the borrowers and receive securities as collateral that
are greater than the amount of the loan. This loan is repaid along with the interest rate,
commonly known as the repo rate.7
Most of the research in the shadow banking system has examined one of these financial
intermediaries separately. Schmidt et al. (2014), He and Xiong (2012), Gennaioli et al.
(2013), and McCabe (2010) consider the role of the MMFs during the financial crisis
and modeled runs in the MMFs. Parlatore Siritto (2015) presents a model to analyze
the impact of the regulations on the shadow banking system. Kacperczyk and Schnabl
(2013) explain the risk-taking behavior of MMFs during the financial crisis. Kacperczyk
and Schnabl (2009), Duygan-Bump et al. (2013), and Anderson et al. (2009) study the role
of CP market during the financial crisis. Krishnamurthy et al. (2014), Gorton et al. (2010),
7Gorton et al. (2010) define “Securitized Banking" as a combination of securitization and repo. Studying
the 2008-2009 subprime housing market crisis, their findings suggest that changes in liquidity and risk of
collateral in the repo market led to a run on the repo market. This is potentially one of the risk propagation
mechanisms that played a role in financial crisis. Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) find that the repo market
segments that were dependent upon the financing from the MMFs collapsed after the financial crisis of
2008. They showed that the repo market is a small portion that could not be the only reason for the collapse
of the shadow banking system, but it is important to consider the repo markets as part of the short-term debt
market. However, these findings do not support Gorton et al. (2010) view which hypothesized that the repo
was one of the main reasons for the financial crisis.
10
and Copeland et al. (2010) model the run on the repo market. We argue that examining
the role of these financial intermediaries separately may be an important objective in itself,
but we also need to understand the dynamic relationship among these dominant players
in the shadow banking system. Our paper tries to fill this gap by examining the long-run
and the short-run relationship among the MMFs, the CP, and the repo markets.
2.2.5 Data
We use 28 years of quarterly data from 1985 to 2013 for the MMFs, the CP, and the repo
markets. Data is obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. For
the MMFs, we collect the level of total financial assets. Figure 1.2 shows that the MMFs
grew slowly until 1990, but registered significant expansion during the later half of the
1990s as well as in the 2005-2008 period. The size of this market was $2.47 trillion at
the beginning of 2007 and in September of 2008 it reached the peak of around $3.76
trillion. Figure 1.2 reflects that the MMFs started becoming unattractive very quickly after
the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008. At the end of 2013, total financial
assets stood at $2.66 trillion, which was significantly lower than the peak reached during
the period of financial crisis.
Very similar behavior can be found in the case of the CP market. At the beginning of
2007, CP were the largest U.S short-term debt instruments, but during the financial crisis
of 2007-2008 the CP market faced significant stress. Figure 1.2 shows the boom and the
bust in the outstanding CP. Until 2005, the total amount of outstanding CP was relatively
stable. Between early 2005 and the summer of 2007, the amount of outstanding CP nearly
doubled, reaching a peak of $2.10 trillion. However, with the onset of the financial crisis
it started to decline and stood around $1.85 trillion in the third quarter of 2007. The
collapse in the CP market happened before the decline in the financial assets of the MMFs.
The aggregate amount of repo funding provided to the shadow banking system (from
MMFs) is also reported in Figure 1.2.8 At the end of 2007, the total amount of repo stood
at its peak around $605.90 billion, which started to decline with the failing of Lehman
8Data for repo markets has been obtained from the Flow of Funds Accounts that the Federal Reserve
Board releases (Table Z.1) (Krishnamurthy et al., 2014).
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Brothers. The evidence in figure 1.2 suggests that the collapse of MMFs and the repo
occurred around the same time, while the collapse of CP market started one year prior to
this time. Table 1.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the data. These initial statistics
show that on an average the CP and the repo market together ($1.21 trillion) is about 80
percent of the MMFs average of $1.51 trillion. This provides a very preliminary evidence
of the potentially strong interconnections that exists between the three markets. In terms
of the overall fluctuations measured by the standard deviations, the findings presented in
Table 1.1 suggests that repo market witnessed higher fluctuations as compared to the other
two markets.
2.3 Dynamic Relationship in the Shadow
Banking System
2.3.1 The Long-Run Relationship
The MMFs are one of the biggest players in the shadow banking system. The CP and
the repo markets are the two most important avenues of investments for the MMFs.
A significant portion financial asset of MMFs are channelized into the CP and the repo
markets. This unique nature of interconnections between the three markets would have
implications on the size and development of these markets. Thus, testing and studying the
nature of long-run relationship between these markets would provide us with interesting
insights into the operations of the shadow banking system.
In order to study the long-run cointegrating relationship, it is important to first test
whether each variable passes the unit root test. In particular, the variables of the
cointegration system need to be non-stationary in levels and stationary in their first
differences. Table 1.2 summarizes the results of the unit root test. We find that the levels
of MMFs, CP and repo markets contain a unit root, whereas the null hypothesis of the
existence of unit root is rejected for the first difference form of these variables.
Let mmf , cp, and repo represent the natural logs of the total financial assets of MMFs,
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CP, and repo markets respectively. Given these variables are non-stationary in levels, the
following equation 1 presents the long-run relationship between the three variables:
mmft = β0 + β1cpt + β2repot + t (2.1)
where, β0, β1, and β2 are the coefficients of the constant, cp, and repo, respectively. If
there exists a common long-run trend between mmf , cp, and repo and they comove in the
long-run, then the estimated cointegrating residual ˆt = mmft− βˆ0− βˆ1cpt− βˆ2repot should
be stationary. To check for stationarity of estimated residuals the standard unit root test
is applied. Here, the coefficients (β0, β1, β2) of equation 1.1 constitute the cointegrating
vector of the system which reflects how the three markets move together in the long run.
One would expect that an increase in cpt and repot would have a positive impact on
mmft. Consequently, both β1 as well as β2 are expected to have a positive sign. This is
because in the shadow banking system, the CP and the repo markets are a part of the asset
side, whereas the MMFs are on the liability side of the balance sheet of the system as a
whole. At the same time, higher trading activity in the CP and the repo markets provides a
perfect ground for expanding activity by the MMFs industry. Further, the relative size of β1
and β2 would provide the information about the relative influence of the CP and the repo
markets on the MMF’s activity.
To estimate the precise cointegrating relationship between the MMFs, the CP, and the
repo markets, we adopt the Stock and Watson (1988) dynamic ordinary least squares
(DOLS) methodology. Given the possibility of serial correlation in the error term, we use
Newey-West heteroscedastic autocorrelation consistent standard errors. More specifically,
the following DOLS is estimated with one lag selected based on the Schwartz criterion:
mmft = β0 + β1cpt + β2repot +
1∑
i=0
∆cpt−i +
1∑
i=0
∆repot−i + et (2.2)
Panel A in Table 1.3 shows the null hypothesis of the existence of unit root in the
estimated cointegration residual (ˆt) is rejected. Panel B and Panel C in Table 1.3
summarize the results of the cointegration from Johansen (1991) and Engle and Granger
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(1987). Based on the Johansen test, there is at least one cointegrating vector between the
MMFs, CP and the repo markets. Also, the results of the Engle-Granger test show the null
hypothesis of unit root for the residual from the regression of the mmf on the repo and
cp is rejected, suggesting the existence of a cointegrating relationship between the three
variables.
Table 1.4 presents the DOLS estimates for the 1985-2013 period in columns 2-3 along
with the P-values. The results clearly show that all coefficients in the vector (β0, β1,
β2) which capture the cointegrating relationship are highly significant. This implies that
MMFs, the CP and the repo markets share a statistical significant common long-term trend
between them. Further, evidence in Table 1.4 reveals some interesting dynamics of the
shadow banking system. Evidence suggests that for the 1985-2013 period, a one percent
increase in the size of the CP market leads to an increase in the size of the MMFs by 0.49
percent in the long run. Whereas, the MMFs are estimated to expand in the long run by
0.59 percent for every one percent increase in the repo market. This means that in the
shadow banking system, the MMFs share a stronger relationship with the repo market as
compared to the CP market. However, contrasting behavior (as discussed separately in the
section below) emerges once the influence of the recent financial crisis is excluded.
Based on these results one can conclude that any deviations from the long-run
relationship between these three markets (ˆt > 0 or ˆt < 0), will induce a movement in at
least one of these markets such that it will restore the shared long-run relationship. Figure
1.3 presents the estimated residuals obtained from the DOLS methodology. This figure
shows how the short-term deviations in the cointegrated system have behaved over time.
We find that right before the financial crisis the size of MMFs was below the long-term
cointegrating trend but this was quickly corrected with the onset of crisis.
The presence of a common cointegrating trend between MMFs, CP and repo markets
can have important policy implications. For example, the impact of measures like the
Treasury’s Guarantee Program for MMFs can potentially extend beyond the MMFs market.
The explicit interconnections estimated in this paper allows us to understand the extent of
propagating mechanism between the policy action and the three most important markets
of the shadow banking system. At the same time, the results also provide a cautionary note
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to the potential problems of moral hazard that is often discussed by the policy makers.
2.3.2 The Short-Run Relationship
The established long-term relationship in the above section suggests that at least one of the
three variables would error-correct for any short-term disequilibrium. The Engel-Granger
representation theorem provides the VECM representation of the integrated system as
follows:
4Yt = ν + Γ(L)4Yt−1 + αβˆ ′Yt−1 + t (2.3)
where, ∆Yt = (∆mmft,∆cpt,∆repot)
′ represents the vector of the first differences of
the three variables and Γ(L) represents a finite-order distributed lag operator. The vector of
adjustment parameters is given by α = (αmmf , αcp, αrepo)′. More specifically, the number of
lags is chosen based on the SBIC and then the following system of equations is estimated:
∆mmft = γ0 + γ
mmf
11 ∆mmft−1 + γ
cp
12∆cpt−1 + γ
repo
13 ∆repot−1 + α
mmf βˆ ′Yt−1 + emmf,t (2.4)
∆cpt = γ0 + γ
mmf
21 ∆mmft−1 + γ
cp
22∆cpt−1 + γ
repo
23 ∆repot−1 + α
cpβˆ ′Yt−1 + ecp,t (2.5)
∆repot = γ0 + γ
mmf
31 ∆mmft−1 + γ
cp
32∆cpt−1 + γ
repo
33 ∆repot−1 + α
repoβˆ ′Yt−1 + erepo,t (2.6)
The last period disequilibrium is presented as βˆ ′Yt−1 = mmft−1−βˆ0−βˆ1cpt−1−βˆ2repot−1.
The statistical significance of coefficients (α′s) indicate that the corresponding variable
corrects in the current period in response to the previous period’s shock which disturbed
the long-term equilibrium. If at least one of the α′s is significantly different from zero then
we can conclude that Yt is cointegrated.
The VECM results are presented in Table 1.5 (columns 2-4) for the 1985-2013 period.
The results show that αmmf is statistically significant, whereas αcp and αrepo are not. It
means any deviation of the CP and the repo markets from the shared long-run trend will
be corrected by the MMFs, while the CP and the repo markets do not participate in the
error correction process. Further, the speed of adjustment for the MMFs is −0.06 which
implies a half-life of little less than three years. Thus, while there is a shared long-run
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relationship between the MMFs, the CP and the repo markets, the error-correction is only
done by the MMFs and it is a fairly sluggish adjustment process. The slow adjustment
is consistent with what international finance and finance researchers have found for the
exchange rate and stock market. For example, researchers have found that even though
dividend and stock prices may tend to move together in the long-run, the speed of error-
correction is usually very sluggish. The purchasing power parity literature also reports
similar findings for the speed of error correction in case of exchange rates.9
Evidence in Table 1.5 (columns 2-4) also suggests that lagged values of change in
MMFs have a positive impact on the current growth rate in both the CP and the repo
markets. However, the reverse is not necessarily the case. The current value of the MMFs
is positively affected by the lagged values of the CP and the repo markets, the coefficients
are not statistically significant. The intuition for such a behavior could lie in the dynamics
of the shadow banking system. Since MMFs are one of the biggest investors in the CP and
the repo markets, growth in the MMFs industry would provide a higher incentive to the
issuers of CP and repo securities. The growth in the MMFs thus provides a positive impetus
to the other two markets. Further, the positive impact of MMFs growth is stronger on the
repo market (0.72) as compared to the CP market (0.27).
Our findings show that if there are any short-term fluctuations in the shadow banking
system, the MMFs correct it to restore the equilibrium that is shared with the CP and the
repo markets. These results also match the simultaneous decline in the CP market and
MMFs in 2007, which enabled the convergence back to the shared long-run path. From
the figures 2 and 3 evidence suggests that the CP market collapsed one year before the
money market collapsed.
2.3.3 Beveridge-Nelson Decomposition
Given that there exists a cointegrating relationship between the MMFs, the CP and the
repo markets, we can use this information to perform a trend-cycle decomposition. This
exercise will further help us understand the trend and cyclical component in all the three
9For example, see Frankel and Rose (1996) and Cochrane (1994).
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variables that are a part of one cointegrated system. In particular, it allows us to measure
the extent of movement in these variables that are permanent and transitory in nature.
Furthermore, it also reinforces the results found in the above sections.
The cointegration results suggest that among the three markets, it is the MMFs that
error corrects, whereas the CP and the repo markets do not. If that is the case then the
cyclical component of the MMFs should be able to identify these dynamics between the
three markets. We adopt a state-space approach of the Beveridge and Nelson (1981) to
estimate the permanent and transitory components of an integrated time series which
Cochrane (1994) and Morley (2002) provided. Based on the equations 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6,
we define the Beveridge-Nelson (BN) decomposition as:
∆mmft − µ
∆cpt − µ
∆repot − µ
βˆ ′Yt
 =

γmmf11 γ
cp
12 γ
repo
13 α
mmf
γmmf21 γ
cp
22 γ
repo
23 α
cp
γmmf31 γ
cp
32 γ
repo
33 α
repo
γmmf41 γ
cp
42 γ
repo
43 α


∆mmft−1
∆cpt−1
∆repot−1
βˆ ′Yt−1
+

emmf,t
ecp,t
erepo,t
eY,t
 (2.7)
In this model, ∆mmft − µ, ∆cpt − µ, and ∆repot − µ are demeaned mmf , cp and repo
and γmmf41 = γ
mmf
11 −βγmmf21 −βγmmf31 , γcp42 = γcp12−βγcp22−βγcp32, γrepo43 = γrepo13 −βγrepo23 −βγrepo33 ,
α = 1− αmmf − αcp − αrepo, and eY,t = emmf,t − ecp,t − erepo,t.
The stated model can be compactly written as:
∆Xt = F∆Xt−1 + νt (2.8)
The BN cycle is−F (I−F )∆Xt and the trend component is Xt+−F (I−F )∆Xt. Figures
1.4 and 1.5 show the results from BN decomposition for the MMFs, the CP and the repo
markets. Figure 1.4 shows the trend and actual for these variables, whereas the cyclical
component for each variable is presented in figure 1.5.
Figure 1.4 shows that for both the markets (CP and repo) the trend and the actual
significantly overlaps as compared to the overlap of the trend and the actual of the MMFs.
This is true particularly for the period around the crisis. The difference between the trend
and the actual (Fig. 1.5) shows that the cyclical component in case of the CP and the repo
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market is fairly small as compared to the MMFs cycles. This further supports the evidence
found earlier that the MMFs adjust for any deviations caused to the long-run relationship.
Between the three markets, the actual behavior of the repo market is the most closest
to its trend line (Fig. 1.4). Further, the MMFs cycle shows some evidence of sustained
deviations from the zero-mean line. This corroborates with the slow adjustment process
found for the MMFs in the cointegrated VAR model. Thus, the overall results are consistent
with the evidence found from the cointegration exercise.
2.3.4 The Role of the Recent Financial Crisis
Given the extraordinary influence of the recent financial crisis on the shadow banking
system, it is important to check for robustness of the results, and also understand the role
of crisis.10 Are the results robust to the exclusion of the crisis period or are they driven
by this extraordinary event? At the same time, this exercise also helps us understand
the change in the dynamics of the shadow banking system. To achieve this objective, we
perform the above exercise for the sub-sample that runs from the first quarter of 1985
through the second quarter of 2007.11
Table 1.4 (columns 4-5) presents the DOLS estimates of the co-integrating vector along
with the associated P-values. The results show that the cointegrating relationship between
the MMFs, the CP and the repo markets is robust to the exclusion of the effects of the
recent financial crisis. The cointegrating vector remains statistically significant. However,
it is interesting to find that the magnitude of the DOLS coefficients for the CP and the
repo markets differ for the sub-sample as compared to the full sample estimates. For the
full sample period, we noted that the repo market is slightly more important than the CP
market in their long-term relationship with the MMFs. In contrast, if we exclude the period
of financial crisis the elasticity of the response of MMFs to the CP and the repo markets is
0.98 and 0.26 respectively. Thus, the influence of CP market on the MMFs in the normal
10 We choose to the second quarter of 2007 when BNP Paribas terminated withdrawals from hedge funds.
11It can also be argued that the dynamic relationship among these variables may have also changed in
1994 given the changes in the MMF industry around that time period. We check whether there was a
break in the cointegration vector in 1994 using Hanson (2002) method and we do not find a break in the
cointegration vector in 1994.
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periods is nearly four times as compared to the repo market’s influence on the MMFs. This
shows the degree of portfolio reshuffling witnessed in the shadow banking industry from
the CP market to the repo market in the crisis period.
Figure 1.6 shows the behavior of the estimated cointegrating residual for the 1985-
2007 sample period. Evidence suggests that in the late 1980s the MMFs operated below
the long-term cointegrating trend but by early 1990s it quickly recovered. In contrast, the
MMFs grew above the trend in the early 2000s but nose-dived in 2005. This behavior
is qualitatively similar to the results obtained when the crisis period is included in
our estimation process (Fig. 1.3); though perhaps the adjustment process is relatively
smoother when the crisis period is excluded. This evidence confirms that the estimated
cointegrating residual is robust to the financial crisis.
For the short-term error correction model, the main results are both qualitatively as well
as quantitatively robust to the exclusion of the crisis period. These results of the VECM are
presented in columns 4-5 of Table 1.5. We find that, again only the adjustment coefficient
of the MMFs (αmmf) is statistically significant. While the CP and the repo markets do
not participate in the error correction process, since both αcp and αrepo are insignificant.
Furthermore, even quantitatively, the speed of adjustment done by the MMFs remains
unchanged at -0.06, same as the full sample period estimate.
From Table 1.5, it is equally interesting to find the changing role of the three markets
when we compare the full sample period (columns 2-3) with the sub-sample period
(columns 4-5) that excludes the crisis. As discussed before, in the case of the full sample
period the positive impact of lagged MMFs growth feeds into the expansion of the CP and
the repo market. However, for the 1985-2007 sample period, while lagged MMFs growth
still has a positive impact (with nearly the same magnitude of 0.7) on the repo market
growth, its impact on the CP market growth is statistically no different than zero. In fact,
there is evidence that growth in the CP market in the past quarter fosters growth in the
MMFs in the current quarter. After the financial crisis, the repo market played as much of
a role as the CP market did.
Overall, the results show that the co-integrating vector as well as the error correcting
coefficients remain robust and do not change with the exclusion of the financial crisis
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period. The robustness test results also highlight the changing dynamics that occurred in
the shadow banking industry over time, particularly in and around the period of financial
crisis.
We also use information from the cointegration witnessed in the 1985-2007 period to
decompose the series into the BN trend and cycle. The results are presented in figures 1.7
and 1.8. These graphs show that there is no qualitative change in the trend-cycle of each
variable for the sample that excludes the crisis period (Fig. 1.7-1.8) as compared to the
full sample (Fig. 1.4-1.5). The cyclical component of the MMFs shows evidence of periods
of sustained deviations from the zero-mean line. This is consistent with the slow error
correction process of the MMFs in the VECM. Quantitatively, we find that right before the
crisis the cyclical component of the MMFs (Fig. 1.8) is slightly larger than the full sample
estimates of the MMFs cycle (Fig. 1.5). This evidence brings forth the extent of stress that
was faced in the shadow banking system due to the financial crisis.
2.4 Conclusion
There is a consensus on the important role played by the financial intermediaries that
are a part of the shadow banking system during the last recession. The money market
funds, commercial papers, and repurchase agreements are three main players at the center
of the shadow banking system. In this study, we examine the long-run and the short-
run relationship among these markets by using a time-series econometric approach. Our
results show that the money market funds, the commercial paper and the repo markets
move together in the long-run. Further, any deviation in the shared long-run equilibrium
forces the money market funds to error-correct to restore the equilibrium relationship on
this long-run path. The results suggest that financial assets of money markets in the short-
run do respond to dynamic movements in the commercial papers and the repo market.
This provides some rationale for the simultaneous growth of the commercial papers and
the repo market with the growing balance sheet of the money market funds.
Further, we use the information from the cointegrating relationship to estimate the
permanent and transitory components of an integrated time series. Our results from the
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trend-cycle decomposition show that the cycle of the money market funds is relatively
greater than the cyclical component of the other two variables. This supports the results
from the error correction model. To examine whether our results are sensitive to the
financial crisis, we undertake the same analysis by excluding the period of recent financial
crisis and compare them with the whole sample results. We find that our results are robust
and do not change when we exclude the recent financial crisis. The robustness check also
brings forth the changing role of the commercial papers and the repo markets in the crisis
era of the shadow banking system.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev.
MMF 1521.2 1507.00 3757.00 242.00 1013.20
CP 990.00 1018.10 2109.00 247.60 479.60
Repo 221.00 142.00 605.00 17.85 180.00
Note: The table provides descriptive statistics for the money
market funds (MMFs), commercial paper (CP) and repurchase
agreements (repo) in billion of dollars.
Table 2.2: Unit Root Test
Variable PP P-Value
MMF 0.98
CP 0.97
Repo 0.72
∆MMF 0.01
∆CP 0.01
∆Repo 0.01
Note:∆ denotes the first difference. PP
denotes the Phillip Perron test
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Table 2.3: Cointegration Test
Panel A : Cointegration results from the DOLS approach
Full sample (1985:Q1 to 2013:Q4) Sub-sample (1985:Q1 to 2007:Q2)
PP P-Value PP P-Value
Residual 0.00 0.00
Panel B : Cointegration results from Engle and Granger (1987)
Full sample (1985:Q1 to 2013:Q4) Sub-sample (1985:Q1 to 2007:Q2)
PP P-Value PP P-Value
Residual 0.00 0.08
Panel C : Cointegration results from Johansen (1991)
Full sample (1985:Q1 to 2013:Q4) Sub-sample (1985:Q1 to 2007:Q2)
Number of Cointegration Vectors Number of Cointegration Vectors
None At most 1 None At most 1
Eigenvalue 0.23 0.04 0.21 0.13
Trace statistic 37.73 7.43 34.13 12.81
0.05 critical value 29.79 15.49 29.79 15.49
P-Value 0.00 0.52 0.01 0.12
Note: This table represents the cointegration results for the full sample as well as the small
sample. Panel A reports the estimates of the unit root for the residual of DOLS. Panel B and C
show the estimates from Johansen(1991) also Engle and Granger(1987). PP denotes the Phillip
Perron test.
Table 2.4: The DOLS estimate of the Co-integrating Vector
Full sample (1985:Q1 to 2013:Q4) Sub-sample (1985:Q1 to 2007:Q2)
Coefficient Value P-Value Value P-Value
β0 3.42 0.00 4.02 0.00
β1 0.49 0.00 0.98 0.00
β2 0.59 0.00 0.26 0.00
Note: The table reports DOLS estimates for the full sample as well as for the sub-sample which
excludes the period of crisis.
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Table 2.5: Estimates from the VECM model
Full sample (1985:Q1 to 2013:Q4) Sub-sample (1985:Q1 to 2007:Q2)
∆mmf ∆cp ∆Repo ∆mmf ∆cp ∆Repo
Dependent Variable coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
∆mmft−1 0.49 0.27 0.72 0.38 0.07 0.74
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) ( 0.29) (0.00)
∆cpt−1 0.07 0.14 0.18 0.33 0.77 0.31
(0.18) (0.14) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.23)
∆repot−1 0.02 -0.06 -0.25 0.01 -0.05 -0.31
(0.53) (0.36) (0.00) (0.73) (.08) (0.00)
βˆ ′Yt−1 -0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.09
(0.01) (0.79) (0.20) (0.02) (0.53) (0.14)
R2 0.41 0.07 0.21 0.42 0.57 0.18
Note: The table reports the estimates (and the associated P-values) from the VECM for the full
sample as well as for the sub-sample which excludes the period of crisis. Second last row shows
the adjustment coefficient of the lagged value of the estimated co-integrating residual.
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Figure 2.1: The Shadow Banking System
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Sources: Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) and Copeland et al. (2014).
This figure presents a broader outline of the shadow banking system. The money market
funds and Securities lender and others (Hedge funds etc.) receive cash from investors and
in return pay a share of the money market funds ($1 NAV) or securities to the lender.
Their cash provides funds for commercial papers or goes to the repurchase agreements
market and in return receives asset back securities. Their findings can go to the dealer
or the conduit. If they go to the Conduit for special purpose they will receive a financial
asset which is called ABCP. If they go to the dealer, it can provide funds for the Hedge
funds or Prime-Brokerage which called repurchase agreements (repo). The repo between
dealers and hedge fund or prime-brokerage without clearing banks are bilateral repo. The
repo between the hedge funds or prime-brokerage when there are clearing banks (BNYM
or JPMC) are Tri-Party repo.
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Figure 2.2: Financial asset of the MMFs, the CP, and the Repo markets
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Notes: The graph shows the volume (levels) of financial assets of the money market funds,
the commercial paper and the repo market in billion of dollars for the 1985-2013 period.
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Figure 2.3: Residual from the DOLS (Full sample - 1985-2014)
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Figure 2.4: Estimated Trend from the BN decomposition
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Notes: The graphs present the trend and actuals of financial assets of the MMFs, the CP
and the Repo markets for the period 1985-2013.
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Figure 2.5: Estimated Cycle from the BN decomposition
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Notes: The graphs present the cycle of financial assets of the MMFs, the CP and the Repo
markets for the period 1985-2013.
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Figure 2.6: Residual from the DOLS (Sub-sample - 1985-2007)
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Figure 2.7: Estimated Trend from the BN decomposition (excluding crisis)
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Notes: The graphs show the estimated BN trend for financial assets of the MMFs, the CP
and the Repo markets for the period excluding the recent crisis 1985 to 2007.
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Figure 2.8: Estimated Cycle from the BN decomposition (excluding crisis)
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Notes: The graphs show the estimated BN cycle for financial assets of the MMFs, the CP
and the Repo markets for the period excluding the recent crisis 1985 to 2007.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of House Prices on Employment: Evidence from
Agnostic Identification
3.1 Introduction
There is a consensus about the role of the housing market in causing and exacerbating
the recent financial crisis. The big decline in housing prices was followed by a significant
decline in real economic activity. The academic research has also started paying more
attention to the relationship between the housing market and the broader economy for the
last two decades. One strand of literature has focused on the relationship between house
prices and macroeconomy expenditure by examining the net worth channel of housing.
The net worth channel can either work directly through the wealth effect or through the
indirect collateral effect. (Hurst and Stafford (2004), Case et al. (2005), Campbell and
Cocco (2007), and Attanasio et al. (2009))
In a series of recent widely cited work, Mian et al. (2013) and Mian and Sufi (2014)
show that this housing net worth channel has significant impact on employment. This
study was motivated by a significant drop in employment during the financial crisis of 2009
in counties that also witnessed a big drop in house prices. Mian and Sufi (2014) argue
that one of the predictions of housing net worth channel is the differential response of
nontradable versus tradable employment across U.S. counties. The underlying idea is that
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non-tradable employment relies heavily on local demand, whereas tradable employment
depends on national or global demand. Therefore if there is a shock to house price, it will
translate into a bigger impact on local non-tradable employment. Mian and Sufi (2014)
found that job losses in the non-tradable sector between 2007 and 2009 were significantly
higher in counties with a large decline in housing net worth. Specifically, they found that a
10 percentage point decline in housing net worth is associated with a 3.7 percentage point
decline in non-tradable employment.
In this paper we provide time-series evidence on the differential impact of housing price
on non-tradable employment and tradable employment. Mian and Sufi (2014) sample
period focused on the period of housing bust and its impact on tradable and non-tradable
employment. Even though the housing bust period is of significant interest, it is also
very important to examine the impact of housing market boom that preceded the bust. In
particular, we use monthly data on tradable and non-tradable employment for 45 states for
the time period 2001-2014 to perform our study. Moreover, unlike cross-sectional studies,
the use of time-series data also allows us to examine the dynamic impact of house price
shock on employment. In particular, our approach allows us to examine how persistent
are the responses of the tradable and non-tradable employment to house price shocks
and how much is the contribution of house price shocks in explaining the variation of
tradable and non-tradable employment variation at different forecast horizons? One of
the important policy questions in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis was the
jobless recovery that took place in the U.S. and whether the housing market crash has any
role in it. Examining the persistence of the response of employment to house price shocks
also helps us in understanding the role of house price shocks in the jobless recovery that
took place in the U.S. after the financial crisis.
To examine the relationship between house prices and employment, we use a
multivariate structural VAR with sign restrictions proposed by Uhlig (2005). This approach
allows us to be agnostic about the impact of house price shock on employment and only
imposes sign restrictions on other variables in the VAR system for a certain period. No
restrictions are placed on the response of the tradable and non-tradable employment to
house price shocks. Our baseline VAR includes building permits, share of non-performing
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loans in total loans, income and employment for all the states in our sample. We assume
that a positive shock to house does not lead to a decline in new building permits, income
and an increase in share of non-performing loans for the next 12 months. We impose no
restriction on the impact of house price shock on tradable and non-tradable employment
and therefore are agnostic about the impact of house price shock on these variables. The
estimation of the structural VAR is done by using Bayesian approach via the Markov Chain
Monte Carlo(MCMC) algorithm. In particular, we use the Penalty Function Approach to
estimate the impulse responses.
Our results show that both tradable and non-tradable employment in all the states
respond significantly to house price shock. In particular, we find that a positive shock
to house price leads to a rise in tradable and non-tradable employment in all the states
and this increase is highly persistent and in many states the effect persists for 4-5 years.
Similar to the findings of Mian and Sufi (2014), we find that non-tradable employment
on average responds more than tradable employment in 28 out of 45 states. The states
with higher response of non-tradable employment to house price shocks are also the states
with higher volatility in house prices. Not surprisingly, we find substantial heterogeneity
in the magnitude and the duration of the responses across different states. For example,
one standard deviation shock to house prices leads to a maximum annual response in non-
tradable employment of 14.4% in Nevada, whereas the corresponding median estimate
is 2.4% in case of New Jersey. We also find that the states with higher response of
non-tradable employment to house price shocks are also the states with higher degree
of correlation between real personal consumption expenditure and house prices. This
suggests that net worth channel via wealth effect does play a role in the differential
response of non-tradable employment to house price changes. Our results are also robust
to alternate method of identification as proposed by Fry and Pagan (2011) 1.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 briefly discusses the related
literature. Section 2.3 introduces the methodology and model. Section 2.4 discusses the
data. The results checks for robustness are presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
1Median Target Approach
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3.2 Literature Review
This paper builds on two strands of literature. We use the developments in the structural
VAR literature to examine the impact of house price shocks on employment across
different states. The literature on the relationship between the housing market and the
macroeconomy has exploded after the financial crisis. The interest in the housing market’s
impact on macroeconomy was driven by the behavior of consumption during the recession
of 2000-01, when the big decline in stock market wealth did not lead to a substantial
decline in consumption. One hypothesis that was proposed by Alan Greenspan which
found support in the academic literature was that the wealth effect arising out of the
housing market is bigger than the wealth effect arising out of stock market wealth.(Case
et al. (2005), Hurst and Stafford (2004), Kishor (2007), Campbell and Cocco (2007),
Cooper (2009), Kermani (2012)). Therefore the rising house wealth in the early part of
2000 neutralized the impact of the big decline in stock market wealth and also decline in
personal disposable income during recession on consumption.
The financial crisis of 2008-09 renewed the interest of policymakers and researchers
in the dynamic relationship between the housing market and macroeconomy. Mian and
Sufi (2008, 2010, 2011) in a series of papers show the role of the housing market on
the fundamentals, by focusing on the financial crisis of 2007-2008.2 Mian et al. (2013)
consider the role of the large collapse of the housing market on household spending.
Their results show households who live in poor and more levered neighborhoods have
a significantly higher marginal propensity to consume therefore they experience greater
wealth losses when housing prices collapse and a much bigger decline in consumption
during 2006 to 2009.3
Our paper is closely related to Mian and Sufi (2014) who find that substantial drop
in employment in the U.S. during 2007-2009 can be partly explained by the changes in
2 Mian and Sufi (2008) consider the role of mortgage credit expansion on default. They show that during
2002-2005 increase in mortgage credit was followed by an increase in default. Mian and Sufi (2010) study
the role of borrowing against increase in home equity. Their results show decrease in the house price from
2002 to 2006 led an increase in household leverage and linked to the 2007 to 2009 economic recession.
Mian and Sufi (2011) show increase in leverage causes sharp decline in consumption during 2002-2006.
3They also show these households face a larger reduction in credit limits and credit scores during 2006-
2009.
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the housing net worth. In particular, they also found that counties that witnessed a larger
decline in housing net worth also witnessed a larger decline in non-tradable employment
than tradable employment. The argument proposed in favor of differential response of
non-tradable versus tradable employment is that non-tradable employment relies heavily
on local demand, whereas tradable employment relies more broadly on national or even
gloabl demand. Therefore a natural prediction of the housing net worth channel is that
while the change in non-tradable employment should be positively correlated with the
change in housing net worth, while the change in tradable employment should not be as
strongly positively correlated.
We examine the relationship between house prices and employment through the lens of
time-series methods. For this purpose, we use recently made available time-series data at
two-digit industry level for 45 different states. We follow Mian and Sufi (2014) definition
of tradable and non-tradable employment across different industries. To do so, we employ
a multivariate structural VAR to examine the impact of house price shocks on tradable and
non-tradable employment. The literature on structural VAR is vast 4(Kilian, 2011; Fry and
Pagan, 2011). One of the problems in the VAR literature is the identification of structural
shocks as the conventional Cholesky decomposition of the VAR system may be sensitive
to the ordering of variables. The shocks emanating from a conventional VAR method
also lacks economic interpretation. There are several ways to get around the problem
of identification in reduced form VAR models. For example, Blachard and Quah (1989)
apply the long run identification to explain the fluctuations in GNP and unemployment,
while Gali (1992) uses the short-run identification to examine whether the IS-LM model fit
the postwar US data. Another approach for identification of shocks is the sign restriction
method that has recently become very popular.5
In this paper, we use a method based on agnostic identification due to Uhlig (2005).
He uses the informal identification to impose the sign on the impulse responses of prices,
4 The SVAR models have been used to address the effect of monetary policy, supply and demand shocks,
the effect of technology shocks, and the exchange rate shocks. (Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Christiano
et al. (1997) ,Christiano et al. (1999), Faust (1998),Sanchez (2010), Altig and Nosal (2002),Peersman and
Straub (2009),Francis et al. (2005),Scholl and Uhlig (2008), Farrant and Peersman (2006))
5 Faust (1998), Uhlig (2005), Canova and De Nicolo (2002), Fujita (2011), Dungey and Fry (2009),
Sanchez (2010)
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non-borrowed reserves, and then, captures the effect of monetary policy shock on the
output without imposing any restriction on the impact of monetary policy on output.6
In our framework, we use a 5-variable VAR model: tradable or non-tradable employment;
building permit; share of non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans; income; and
house price. We assume that a positive shock to house price does not decrease building
permits and income and does not increase share of non-performing loans for the next 12
months. We do not impose any restriction on the impact of house price on employment.
In other words, we are agnostic about the impact of house price on employment.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 The SVAR Model
In this sub-section we briefly explain the structural VAR model that is used to examine the
research question in this paper. A simple structural VAR can be written as:
β0Yt = β1Yt−1 + β2Yt−2 + ...+ βkYt−k + t, t = 1, 2, ..., T (3.1)
where Yt is an m × 1 vector of logarithm of real house price, tradable/non-tradable
employment, housing building permit, real personal disposable income, and ratio of
nonperforming loans to total loans. t are shocks with no serial correlation, mean zero,
and variance-covariance Ω. A conventional VAR model is the reduced form of structural
VAR, which can be written as:
Yt = B1Yt−1 +B2Yt−2 + ...+BkYt−k + et, t = 1, 2, ..., T (3.2)
6 Some researchers such as Peersman (2005) and Dungey and Fry (2009) consider the effect of multiple
shocks in their models, but Uhlig (2005) considers only one shock.
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Bk is β−10 βk and et is a vector of errors with mean zero, variance-covariance Σ , and no
serial correlation. et is β−10 t, then we have
Σ = E(etet−1) = β−10 Ωβ
−1
0 (3.3)
which gives us variance-covariance matrix of the structural innovations. The solution to
the reduced form of SVAR is
Yt = C(L)et, (3.4)
with C(L) = (I − B(L))−1, where C(L) shows the impulse response to a unit innovation
in et. The fundamental problem in estimating the structural VAR model is that we cannot
directly estimate this equation without further identifying restrictions.
Two methods have been proposed for identification of the SVAR in the literature. First,
there is formal identification which refers to using certain information about the arrival
shock. The second approach is informal identification, which refers to imposing prior
restrictions that come from the existing literature and then testing if these satisfy economic
theory (Uhlig, 2005).
3.3.2 Sign Restriction SVAR
Whether the identification is formal or informal, there are multiple approaches to identify
the structural parameters (shocks) from the reduced form of the SVAR model. In general,
we can divide them into two methods: parametric and non-parametric identification.
Fry and Pagan (2011) classify identification by the short-run restrictions, the long-run
restrictions, and a recursive casual structure as parametric and the sign restriction as a
non-parametric. The sign restrictions are more often used in recent literature, because it
uses a prior theorizing explicit restrictions while these restrictions are often used implicitly.
It also imposes the sign restriction on the impulse responses for few periods after the shock
instead of using a specific shape of the impulse responses.Uhlig (2005), Faust (1998),
Canova and De Nicolo (2002) and Uhlig (2005) uses priori sign restriction to solve the
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structural identification problem when they consider the effects of monetary policy shocks.
To choose the fitted impulse responses from the shocks, Uhlig (2005) introduces two
approaches, the pure sign restriction and the penalty function by imposing signs for a few
periods after shock.
Suppose we have the reduced form VAR model:
Yt = C(L)et, (3.5)
where Yt is the m dimensional vector of log real house price, log employment tradable or
non-tradable, log house permit, log personal income, and ratio of nonperforming loans to
total loans. C(L) is a finite-order autoregressive lag polynomial and et is innovations with
variance-covariance Σ , and no serial correlation. To get structural shocks, we need to
estimate β−10 since et=β
−1
0 t. From the reduced VAR model, we have estimated shocks eˆt.
To construct a matrix m ×m of β−10 , we can use some weights that will produce impulse
responses with correct signs which reflect that the constructed shocks are uncorrelated, so
we design an algorithm to generate weights.
Suppose that there are a total of m fundamental innovations, which are mutually
independent and normalized to be of variance 1. They can ,therefore, be written as a
vector η of size m × 1 with E(ηη′).7 Now we can write it again as: A−1 = η. Where
Σ = E[η′tηt] = A
−1E[t′t]A
′−1 = A−1A′−1. To get A−1, let TT ′ = Σ be the Cholesky
decomposition of Σ. Then A−1 = TQ also satisfy Σ = A−1A′−1 8 for any orthogonal matrix
Q(QQ′ = I).
There are two popular ways to distinguish Q. Given Rotation and Householder
transformations(QR decomposition) are two ways to get Q. In this paper, we use the
Given Rotation approach as proposed by Uhlig (2005). Since we are interested in studying
the impulse responses of employment to house price shock (structural shocks), then we
just identify this shock and ignore shocks of other variables.9
After determining Q matrix for the identification strategy, we need to get the impulse
7Independence of the fundamental innovations is an appealing assumption adopted in much of the VAR
literature
8TT ′ = Σ = A−1A′−1
9For more information see Fry and Pagan (2011).
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vector. Uhlig (2005) defined that “a” is an impulse vector iff there is an m dimensional
vector α of unit length so that a = Qα. Given an impulse vector a, we can calculate the
impulse response. Following Uhlig (2005), we use the Bayesian approach (a uniform
distribution) to get “a”. The estimated impulse vector should be multiplied by the
orthogonal matrix A and verified to determine whether it is satisfying the impose signs
or not. In general, if all these impulse responses satisfy the sign restriction, it is kept;
otherwise, it is discarded. In order to test this Uhlig (2005) introduces two different
algorithms: the Pure (rejection) Sign Restriction and the Penalty Function approach.
In the case of the rejection approach, the algorithm consists of a number of sub-draws to
generate “a" for each posterior draw. The algorithm then checks whether the imposed sign
restrictions are satisfied for each restricted response and each restricted period, starting
off with response of the shocked variable itself.
In the penalty function approach, the algorithm is not based on the acceptance and
rejection of sub-draws. Rather it uses an impulse vector “a" which comes as close as
possible to satisfying the imposed sign restrictions by minimizing a function that penalizes
sign restriction violations.10
We apply the procedure of sign restriction as follows. First, based on Normal-Inverted
Wishart prior for B andΣ, we estimate the Normal-Wishart posterior for B andΣ. Second,
we use the Cholesky decomposition to extract the orthogonal matrix from Σ.11 Third, by
using uniform distribution we estimate the impulse vector ”a”. Fourth, take a joint draw
from both the unrestricted Normal-Wishart posterior of the VAR parameters and a uniform
distribution posterior of “a”. Fifth, we multiply the impulse vector times the impulse
response from previous step. Sixth, we use the penalty function to choose the best impulse
responses which satisfy the sign restriction. Seventh, repeat Steps 2-6.
10See Uhlig (2005)for more detail.
11The Cholesky decomposition here is just a way to orthogonalise shocks rather than an identification
strategy.
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3.4 Data
In order to examine the effect of house price on employment, we use monthly data
for employment from 2-digit industries, real personal disposable income, new housing
building permit, ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans for banks, and real house
price index by state level for the period 2001 to 2015.12
Employment The Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages Program (QCEW)
releases employment and wage information about workers.13 Data is available by state
level and for the two-digit NAICS14 industries. We consider total employment in the private
sector for all 19 two-digit industries.
In order to classify an industry as tradable and non-tradable,we follow Mian and Sufi
(2014) and define tradable industries as industries that respond to the national demand
while non-tradable industries respond to the local demand.15 In this paper, we categorize
all industries as tradable or nontradable according to their response to the national or
local demand as a baseline. We also consider other definitions for robustness check of our
results. Figure 2.1 shows non-tradable, tradable and total employment data for all the
states. Table 2.1 reports all classifications that we use in this paper.
Real House Price We use state-level house price data from the Freddie Mac. This
index reflects the refinancing decisions to measure of price based on loans purchased by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. We deflate the nominal house prices by PCE price index to
obtain real house prices for each state. Figure 2.1 also shows the house price data for
different states in our sample.16.
Income The Bureau of Economic Analysis releases personal income (thousand of
12We consider 45 states because data for other states are not available.
13U.S. Census Bureau publishes the County Business Patterns data set
14The North American Industry Classification System or NAICS.
15 Mian and Sufi (2014) use two different methods to classify industries. Based on method one “retail
and world trade" classification, they define four categories, tradable, nontradable, construction, and other.
One industry is tradable if total exports plus imports are greater than $500M. Non-tradable industries
are the retail sector and restaurants. Construction industries include construction, real estate, and land
development. The rest of the industries are other. The second method, “Geographical Concentration Based"
classification, is based on geographical concentration. Mian and Sufi (2014) explain production of tradable
good should be more concentrated geographically while nontradable industries should be geographically
dispersed.
16See http://www.freddiemac.com for more information
42
dollars) quarterly for states. We get real personal disposable income by deflating it with
the PCE price index. We use the linear interpolation method to get monthly data from the
quarterly data.
Housing Building Permit The building permit as a proxy for residential investment
has an important role in economic activity. Leamer (2007), Ghent and Owyang (2010) and
Strauss (2013) consider the relationship between the housing permits and employment.
Strauss (2013) explains that increase in permits can show the expectation of households
for future job also they can use their house as collateral to increase consumption. In this
paper we use new private housing units authorized by building permits data for each state
to control the effect of it which are released by US. Bureau of the Census.
Ratio of Nonperforming Loans to Total Loans The empirical literature suggests that
changes in house prices lead to a change in the share of nonperforming loans in balance
sheet of banks. Based on this idea, we use share of nonperforming loans in total loans
for each state in our paper. We get monthly data for each state from the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council(US).17
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Cyclical Correlation Between House Prices and Employment
We first undertake a preliminary exercise in examining the relationship between two types
of employment and house prices. For this purpose, we decompose the movements in
tradable and non-tradable employment and real house prices for all 45 states in our
sample into a trend and a cycle using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Table 2.2 reports
the correlation between the cycle of the housing price and the cycle of both the tradable
and non-tradable employment. Our results clearly show that there is a strong positive
correlation between the non-tradable employment cycle and the cycle of housing prices for
all the states. These results are consistent with Mian and Sufi (2014) who find significant
correlation between non-tradable employment losses and the housing net worth decline.
17 www.federalreserve.gov/apps/mdrm/data-dictionary.
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We also find positive correlation between the tradable employment cycle with the cycle
of house prices in all the states except Nebraska and Massachusetts. The average of
the correlation of the non-tradable employment cycle with the house price cycle is 0.52.
There is significant heterogeneity in the correlation with the lowest correlation of 0.07
for Massachusetts and the highest correlation of 0.92 for Florida. The average of the
correlation across states between the tradable employment cycle and the cycle of housing
prices is 0.39. The results for the correlation between the HP cycle of tradable and non-
tradable employment with the HP cycle of house prices clearly suggest that non-tradable
employment for most the states have higher correlation with house prices.
3.5.2 Estimating Employment Response to House Price Shock from
Agnostic Identification
The correlation analysis suggests that there is a strong positive relationship between house
prices and employment with the correlation between non-tradable employment cycle and
house price cycle substantially higher than the correlation between tradable employment
cycle and house price cycle for most of the states. Even though the results from correlation
analysis is informative, it does not provide us a detailed answer on the relationship
between employment and house prices. For example, how does tradable or non-tradable
employment react to a shock to house price? How persistent are the responses to the house
price shocks? How significant are the heterogeneities in the responses across different
states? How much variation at different forecast horizons in tradable and non-tradable
employment can be explained by house price shocks?
To examine these questions in detail, we use a structural VAR with agnostic
identification as proposed by Uhlig (2005). In the first step of estimation, we calculate
the number of the lags for the VAR system without constant and a time trend 18 that
includes the level of the logs of the real housing prices, real personal disposable income,
and new private housing units authorized by building permits and ratio of nonperforming
loans to total loans. We adopt the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm for the estimation
18See Uhlig (2005) and Uhlig (1994) for more information
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of this model with sign restrictions. Following Uhlig (2005), we use Bayesian approach
to estimate the VAR parameters given the assumed Normal-Wishart prior starting in the
first step. We use 40000 draws from posterior and 20000 sub-draws for each of them
to generate impulse responses for 60 step-ahead (5 years). For testing robustness of the
results related to the number of acceptable draws, we also run it 2000 times (Uhlig, 2005).
We identify the effect of the house price shock by directly imposing the sign restrictions
on the impulse responses of other variables. For identification, we assume that following
a positive shock to the house price, building permits and state-level income do not
decrease for 12 months, while the share of nonperforming loans in total loans also
do not increase for 12 months. We leave the response of tradable and non-tradable
employment unrestricted. We are therefore agnostic about the response of different types
of employment to house price shocks. Table 2.5 reports the details of the nature of the sign
restrictions being imposed in the model. As compared to other methods of identification,
these restrictions are very mild. These restrictions do help us in the identification of the
responses of the house price shock on employment over time.
Figure 2.3 shows the impulse responses of non-trabable employment to one standard
deviation shock to house prices. The estimates for the median, 16 and 84 quantiles are
reported. The main result of the graph can be interpreted as follows:
1. We find that both the tradable and non-tradable employment react strongly and
positively to house price shock and there is significant heterogeneity in the
persistence of the response across different states.
2. The response of non-tradable employment is higher on average than the response of
tradable employment.
3. Ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans for all of states reacts negatively and
slowly to a house price shock. It takes typically 2 years for the shock to disappear.
4. Building permits react positively and drop after around one year.
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5. Income reacts slightly positively at the beginning and then starts to increase and
reaches a pleateau.
6. House prices revert to mean very slowly in response to its own shock implying high
degree of persistence in house prices across different states.
Our results show that Nevada has the highest average response of non-tradable
employment to one standard deviation house price shocks, while New Jersey has the
lowest average response . Figure 2.4 shows the results for the response of tradable
employment to house price shocks. Nevada also has the highest average response of
tradable employment, whereas Maryland has the lowest response. The positive response
of NT and T is consistent with the literature view. Our finding clearly show if there is
a positive shock from the house price then employment of NT and T industries increase
while Mian and Sufi (2014) show the decline in housing net worth decrease NT and they
do not find significant results for T.
To compare the differential impact of employment to house prices shock, Figure 2.5
presents the median impulse responses of tradable and non-tradable employment to one
standard deviation house price shock from the SVAR model with sign restrictions. Table 2.3
also shows that the average of the medium impulse responses of non-tradable employment
to a house price shock is higher than it is for tradable employment to the same housing
price shock for 28 states.19 Our results for these 28 states are consistent with Mian and Sufi
(2014) findings who find that counties with significant decline in house prices were also
the counties that witnessed significant decline in jobs during the financial crisis. While our
results are broadly consistent with their resutls, there are some states where the tradable
employment respond more to house price shocks than non-tradable employment. The
argument that non-tradable employment is more sensitive to local housing market is also
supported by our results. Moreover, we find that tradable employment also responds
positively to local house price shocks. This result is different than what Mian and Sufi
(2014) find in their study. This is not surprising as their study looked at short-term
19 these states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington,
Wisconsin
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response of employment to housing bust. In our analysis, we are estimating the dynamic
response and a positive/negative wealth effect arising out of an increase/decrease in house
price will also have an impact on tradable employment, albeit the impact on tradable
employment may be different than the impact on non-tradable employment.
Looking at the nature of the dynamic response, we find that both the tradable and non-
tradable employment follow a hump-shaped pattern in most of the states. The median
response for most of the states plateau around 20-30 months. As explained earlier, we
also find significant heterogeneity both in the magnitude as well as the speed at which
the plateau is reached for the different states. The persistent effect of house price shock
on employment may also provide an explanation on the puzzle of jobless recovery that
immediately followed the financial crisis of 2008-09. Our results show that it takes almost
3-4 years for the impact of house price shock on employment to disappear.
3.5.3 Variance Decomposition
We can also use the estimated SVAR model with sign restrictions to estimate the percentage
of variations in different variables in the VAR system arising due to house price shocks at
different forecast horizons. Table 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 report the results for this variance
decomposition exercise for both the tradable and the non-tradable SVAR model. The
results in a sense reinforces the results discussed above for the impulse responses We
find that for the states where non-tradable employment responds more to house price
shocks are also the states where house price shocks explain a bigger percentage of forecast
error variance especially at short horizons. One of the interesting findings of the variance
decomposition exercise is that at long horizons , around 20-30 percent of the variation in
employment can be explained by house price shocks implying relatively large role of the
housing market in the job market in different states. As expected, we also find substantial
heterogeneity in the percentage variation of employment explained by house price shocks
for different states. Even at very short-horizons (1- and 2-months ahead), we find that for
states like Arizona, California, Florida, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, South Carolina,
Texas and Virginia, almost 20-30 percent variation in non-tradable employment can be
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explained by house price shocks.
3.5.4 Differential Effect Channel
The results presented above suggest that non-tradable employment on average responds
more to house price shocks than tradable employment. In this sub-section, we dig deeper
into the causes for this differential effect. In particular, we examine the relationship
between the differential impact and the correlation of house prices with consumption and
also examine whether states with higher volatility in house prices are also the states with
bigger response of employment to house price shocks.
One of the reasons proposed for the differential effect of house price shock on
employment is that demand channel is stronger for non-tradable employment. This is
based on the idea that states where consumption is more sensitive to house prices are also
the states where demand channel will be stronger. Using state level personal consumption
expenditure data, we examine this hypothesis. In the first step, we calculate the correlation
between the cycle of the real house prices and the cycle of consumption. Then we examine
whether the states with high correlation between the cycles of consumption and house
prices are also the states where non-tradable employment responds higher on average.
Table 2.4 reports the results for this exercise. Not surprisingly, we find that the states with
higher correlation between the cycles of house price and consumption also have higher
response of non-tradable employment on average. The average of this correlation is 0.26
for non-tradable employment, whereas the average of this correlation is only 0.09 for the
tradable employment
We also want to explore whether differences in the housing market volatility across
states plays any role in this differential effect. To examine the effect of volatility on
the relative response of two types of employment, we run a regression from the average
impulse responses of tradable and non-tradable employment on the deviation of the house
prices growth for each state. Our results show the standard deviation of real house price
growth can explain 39% of the variations in the average of the impulse responses for
non-tradable employment whereas it is 15% for tradable employment. These results are
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consistent with Mian and Sufi (2014) who also find similar results. The
3.5.5 Robustness Check
To examine if our results from the baseline model are robust, we present three types
of the robustness checks. First, we check for the robustness of the identification of
structural shocks. As we explained in the previous section, there are many values for
the impulse vector (“a”) that satisfy the sign restriction. Fry and Pagan (2011)suggest
median target(MT) approach to selecting a single value for the impulse vector “a” . In this
method, we choose a value for “a” that produces impulse responses that are enough close
to the median responses. To choose the best draw for “a” we performed 1000 iteration
(Fry and Pagan, 2011). The differences between the MT impulse responses and the median
responses from the penalty function method show how results from the penalty function
are biased.
Figure 3.6 shows our results from the MT approach. As we can see, the gap between
the penalty function and the MT approach is negligible. These results suggest that
identification for “a” based on the penalty function is robust to the alternative method
of imposing sign restriction.
The second robustness check is done on the size of the VAR system. To see whether our
results are sensitive to the set of variables used in the VAR system, we drop income from
our 5-variable baseline model. Again the sign restriction remains the same as the baseline
model where we assume that a positive shock to house price does not decrease building
permits and does not increase non-performing loans for the next 12 months. Figure 3.7.1
in the appendix shows the impulse responses for this exercise. The results clearly show
that our baseline results are not sensitive to the inclusion of income in the VAR system.
In addition, we have also considered a robustness check where the sign restrictions
are imposed for 6 months in place of the baseline restriction of 12 months. That is, we
assume that a positive shock to house price does not lead to a decline in building permit
and income and does not lead to an increase in nonperforming loan for next 6 months.
The results obtained from this exercise (not reported) also show that our results are robust
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to this restriction.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of house prices on employment by using time-series data
on 45 U.S. states over the sample period 2001-2014. We also examine whether there
is a differential impact of house prices on non-tradable employment as compared to the
tradable employment. To do so, we use a multivariate structural VAR model with sign
restrictions. We assume that a positive shock to house price does not lead to a decline
in income and builiding permits and an increase in non-performing loans for 12 months.
We keep the response of employment to house price shock unrestricted. Our results show
significant response of employment to house price shock with a hump-shaped response
for most of the states. In particular, we find that in 28 out of 45 states, the response
of non-tradable employment is higher than tradable employment. There is significant
heterogeneity, however, in the magnitude of responses. On average we find that states
with higher volatility in house prices have higher response of non-tradable employment to
house price shocks. We also find that states with higher correlation between consumption
cycle and house price cycles are also the states with relatively higher response of non-
tradable employment as compared to the tradable employment.
50
Table 3.1: Industries Classification
Baseline case 1 Case 2 Case 3
All Industries T NT T NT T NT T NT
11-Agriculture,forestry,fishing    
21-mining,quarrying and oil and gas    
22-Utilities  
23-Construction 
31-33-manufacturing    
42-Wholesale trade 
44-45- retail trade    
48-49- Transportation and warehousing  
51-information  
52-finance and insurance  
53-real state-rental and leasing 
54-professional and technical services 
56-Administrative and waste services  
61-Education services  
71-Art,Entertainment recreation  
72-Accommodation and food services    
Note: The table reports all industries, tradable (T) and non-tradable (NT) industries
based on different classification.
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Figure 3.1: Employment
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conserve space but available upon request.
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Figure 3.2: Housing Prices
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Table 3.2: Correlation Between Employment Cycle and House Price Cycle
Tradable Non-Trabable
Alabama 0.6611 0.6226
Alaska 0.1418 0.4621
Arizona 0.8338 0.9054
Arkansas 0.4976 0.5969
California 0.4456 0.6740
Colorado 0.2335 0.4202
Connecticut 0.1361 0.4172
Florida 0.7786 0.9243
Georgia 0.6045 0.6851
Idaho 0.8176 0.8743
Illinois 0.4099 0.5486
Indiana 0.2808 0.2831
Kansas 0.1647 0.1977
Kentucky 0.2830 0.3316
Louisiana 0.1866 0.2534
Iowa 0.1224 0.3252
Maryland 0.6038 0.7047
Massachusetts -0.3332 0.0796
Michigan 0.5967 0.6402
Minnesota 0.2486 0.4530
Mississippi 0.6412 0.6222
Missouri 0.3668 0.4628
Montana 0.6986 0.7129
Nebraska -0.0576 0.2028
Nevada 0.7824 0.8656
New Hampshire 0.0617 0.4357
New Jersey 0.2463 0.5026
New Mexico 0.7156 0.7738
New York 0.1124 0.1836
North Carolina 0.5880 0.6341
North Dakota 0.2369 0.3494
Ohio 0.1445 0.2330
Oklahoma 0.1084 0.2720
Oregon 0.7070 0.8051
Pennsylvania 0.1772 0.3695
South Carolina 0.5730 0.6607
South Dakota 0.3224 0.2975
Tennessee 0.6288 0.6055
Texas 0.3440 0.4631
Utah 0.8302 0.8615
Vermont 0.3199 0.5958
Virginia 0.4731 0.6658
Washington 0.5575 0.8254
West Virginia 0.3509 0.4272
Wisconsin 0.1683 0.4158
Note: This table presents the correlation between
the cycle of Non-tradable employment and house
prices also the correlation between tradable
employment and house prices. To get the cycles ,
we use Hodrick Prescott filter.
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Table 3.3: The Average Median Impulse Responses
Non-Tradable Tradable
Alabama 0.00591 0.0058
Alaska 0.0028 0.0033
Arizona 0.0088 0.0058
Arkansas 0.0035 0.0035
California 0.0066 0.0048
Colorado 0.0073 0.0073
Connecticut 0.0074 0.0055
Florida 0.0080 0.0050
Georgia 0.0081 0.0068
Idaho 0.0076 0.0057
Illinois 0.0050 0.0046
Indiana 0.0043 0.0055
Kansas 0.0060 0.0084
Kentucky 0.0053 0.0052
Louisiana 0.0042 0.0036
Iowa 0.0028 0.0034
Maryland 0.0031 0.0022
Massachusetts 0.0049 0.0043
Michigan 0.0031 0.0047
Minnesota 0.0054 0.0048
Mississippi 0.0060 0.0041
Missouri 0.0049 0.0050
Montana 0.0070 0.0052
Nebraska 0.0054 0.0032
Nevada 0.0126 0.0109
New Hampshire 0.0027 0.0030
New Jersey 0.0021 0.0030
New Mexico 0.0046 0.0054
New York 0.0034 0.0059
North Carolina 0.0077 0.0063
North Dakota 0.0040 0.0032
Ohio 0.0057 0.0049
Oklahoma 0.0071 0.0075
Oregon 0.0038 0.0041
Pennsylvania 0.0036 0.0030
South Carolina 0.0082 0.0056
South Dakota 0.0036 0.0078
Tennessee 0.0035 0.0034
Texas 0.0069 0.0063
Utah 0.0022 0.0047
Vermont 0.0056 0.0058
Virginia 0.0046 0.0037
Washington 0.0080 0.0058
West Virginia 0.0033 0.0038
Wisconsin 0.0048 0.0040
Note: This table present the average median
impulse responses of tradable and non-tradable
to a positive house price shock.
55
Table 3.4: House Price-Consumption Correlation and Employment
Consumption corr(NT,corr1) corr(T,corr1)
Personal consumption expenditures 0.3259 0.0950
Goods 0.3253 0.0807
Durable goods 0.3028 0.0325
Motor vehicles and parts 0.2887 0.1357
Furnishings and durable household equipment 0.3584 0.0257
Recreational goods and vehicles 0.3036 0.0475
Other durable goods 0.1345 -0.0651
Nondurable goods 0.3057 0.0942
Food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption 0.3504 0.1655
Clothing and footwear 0.1410 -0.1348
Gasoline and other energy goods 0.1800 -0.0738
Other nondurable goods 0.4511 0.3340
Services 0.2947 0.1753
Household consumption expenditures (for services) 0.3484 0.1862
Transportation services 0.3228 0.0636
Recreation services 0.1224 0.1292
Food services and accommodations 0.3360 0.1934
Financial services and insurance 0.2969 0.0142
Other services 0.0392 0.1200
Less: Receipts from sales of goods and services by nonprofit institutions 0.1634 0.2375
Note: This table provide the correlation between the average median impulse responses for Non-tradable ( or
Tradable ) and the correlation between the cycle of consumption expenditure and the cycle of house prices.
Table 3.5: Sign Restriction
Variable shock HPI NPLT I PB E
HPI > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 or < 0
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Table 3.6: Variance Decomposition
State Period T NT State Period T NT
Alabama 1 6.67 12.42 Georgia 1 1.21 2.23
2 7.65 13.21 2 2.89 3.16
5 14.05 18.49 5 7.49 7.38
10 19.98 21.04 10 15.73 14.88
20 21.6 19.92 20 27.12 26.65
30 20.95 18.33 30 30.31 30.15
Alaska 1 1.29 17.59 Idaho 1 5.22 14.03
2 2.44 17.73 2 6.29 14.25
5 5.3 19.51 5 10.04 15.76
10 11.1 20.86 10 14.05 18.31
20 17.51 22.87 20 20.86 22.79
30 22.92 24.26 30 23.91 24.35
Arizona 1 1.66 23.35 Illinois 1 1.43 3.29
2 3.16 22.95 2 2.34 4.22
5 8.63 22.76 5 7.45 10.58
10 15.8 23.78 10 21.2 25.23
20 23.19 25.65 20 36.41 38.95
30 25.03 25.94 30 37.04 39.77
Arkansas 1 13.73 11.66 Indiana 1 4.56 5.23
2 13.83 12.59 2 5.09 5.64
5 14.46 13.8 5 6.99 8.19
10 15.23 15.18 10 11.84 13.58
20 16.66 17.61 20 19.93 20.25
30 17.61 18.83 30 21.8 21.9
California 1 6.38 19.82 Kansas 1 3 11.51
2 6.64 19.8 2 3.83 12.35
5 8.52 20 5 7.44 16.12
10 12.52 21.38 10 17.66 24.44
20 20.98 27.99 20 28.65 29.1
30 25.93 30.39 30 31.78 29.91
Colorado 1 9.19 5.02 Kentucky 1 19.18 16.7
2 9.58 5.56 2 18.88 17.11
5 10.73 6.98 5 19.06 17.97
10 13.89 10.48 10 19.33 18.96
20 19.97 19.72 20 20.55 21.76
30 23.84 22.85 30 20.41 22.06
Connecticut 1 8.73 5.38 Louisiana 1 3.12 0.98
2 9.07 7.61 2 3.65 1.56
5 12.01 16.42 5 7.3 3.54
10 17 24.91 10 11.27 6.26
20 23.18 31.21 20 15.33 10.91
30 26.06 32.42 30 18.26 13.3
Florida 1 2.01 26.29 lowa 1 10.39 3.27
2 2.95 26.06 2 10.57 5.13
5 6.63 26.18 5 11.42 9.2
10 11.73 31.26 10 18.85 17.5
20 24.42 38.4 20 32.02 32.44
30 31.39 38.27 30 35.82 34.7
Note:
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Table 3.7: Variance Decomposition
State Period T NT State Period T NT
Maryland 1 8.99 10.21 Nevada 1 38.53 26.68
2 10.67 11.77 2 37.87 26.17
5 11.29 12.85 5 37.18 27.28
10 14.36 15.61 10 36.4 33
20 19.92 21.61 20 37.77 40.04
30 24.31 25.26 30 36.11 39.7
Massachusetts 1 1.94 7.15 New Hampshire 1 2.56 7.61
2 3.61 8.85 2 3.49 8.36
5 9.87 13.85 5 4.86 9.63
10 16.42 17.73 10 6.75 14.71
20 22.93 23.54 20 13.66 20.6
30 25.54 25.07 30 19.56 23.23
Michigan 1 6.07 5.69 New Jersey 1 1.12 1.66
2 6.59 6.07 2 2.35 2.29
5 8.46 7.51 5 7.43 5.87
10 10.29 9.44 10 11.14 9.86
20 17.37 19.21 20 16.76 15.59
30 21.87 24.23 30 19.96 17.95
Minnesota 1 2.66 7.23 New Mexico 1 4.95 20.47
2 3.01 7.71 2 5.41 20.29
5 5.79 11.22 5 7.02 20.94
10 11.46 17.86 10 12.1 21.74
20 20.22 24.13 20 20.24 21.51
30 24.34 25.61 30 22.81 20.5
Mississippi 1 11.91 3.97 New York 1 15.8 42.62
2 12.43 4.42 2 15.81 40.53
5 12.73 6.07 5 16.63 34.28
10 13.3 10.92 10 19.96 32.95
20 16.44 20.71 20 26.07 29.64
30 18.19 23.75 30 28.76 25.41
Missouri 1 12.64 2.93 North Carolina 1 6.06 15.91
2 13.12 4.53 2 6.31 17.08
5 15.21 7.43 5 8.01 19.52
10 16.91 11.2 10 12.72 22.6
20 19.05 20.96 20 20.42 27.15
30 20.18 25.87 30 23.86 27.89
Montana 1 5.42 57.04 North Dakota 1 22.29 7.73
2 6.01 55.82 2 21.99 8.36
5 8.57 54.42 5 22.5 12.84
10 13.24 51.89 10 24.89 20.81
20 17.66 46.22 20 25.34 24.55
30 18.71 41.36 30 23.13 24.02
Nebraska 1 1.01 19.81 Ohio 1 2.06 1.11
2 2.13 19.86 2 2.91 1.95
5 4.36 19.84 5 8.47 5.57
10 9.34 21.42 10 20.08 20.02
20 17.75 24.9 20 30.53 37.41
30 21.92 26.09 30 31.31 39.47
Note:
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Table 3.8: Variance Decomposition
State Period T NT State Period T NT
Oklahoma 1 4.95 4.73 Utah 1 20.48 19.18
2 5.86 6.32 2 20.61 19.1
5 8.92 9.52 5 21.01 19.04
10 14.31 15.13 10 21.67 19.1
20 24.87 22.84 20 23.71 22.46
30 28.92 26.66 30 23.42 22.94
Oregon 1 17 11.67 Vermont 1 11.01 6.3
2 17.09 11.72 2 11.21 7.18
5 17.16 12.02 5 12.76 12.55
10 17.65 12.85 10 16.51 17.9
20 18.45 17.27 20 20 21.51
30 19.3 20.56 30 21.42 22.72
Pennsylvania 1 1.04 5.23 Virginia 1 19.18 39.79
2 2.25 6.18 2 19.43 39.33
5 7.83 11.64 5 20.22 37.43
10 12.67 17.2 10 22.2 34.35
20 19.15 24.72 20 25.79 34.05
30 23 27.86 30 26.54 33.38
South Carolina 1 10.15 19.75 Washington 1 4.62 11.43
2 11.6 21.06 2 5.7 11.7
5 14.13 24.3 5 8.9 15.19
10 18.31 26.56 10 12.25 26.06
20 27.26 30.36 20 18.66 34.71
30 30.81 31.43 30 25.85 35.63
South Dakota 1 24.03 21.86 West Virginia 1 13.1 13.57
2 23.89 21.96 2 13.21 14.31
5 24.06 21.95 5 13.77 15.29
10 24.75 22.66 10 15.03 16.78
20 26.09 23.13 20 16.04 18.67
30 26.85 23.01 30 17.29 20.49
Tennessee 1 1 1.83 Wisconsin 1 4.63 1.28
2 2.03 2.74 2 4.96 2.26
5 8.28 5.99 5 7.31 8.84
10 18.52 12.64 10 12.85 19.94
20 29.49 22.65 20 21.31 27.54
30 32.1 23.13 30 24.11 28.3
Texas 1 38.71 23.81
2 38.4 23.97
5 37.24 24.96
10 34.84 27.04
20 32.12 29.21
30 30.5 29.37
Note:
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses from The House Price Shock (Baseline Model)
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Notes: Impulse responses form a housing price shock on Non-Tradable (NT) employment,
using the penalty function approach in the sign restriction method for the baseline model.
The results for the rest of states are not reported to conserve space but available upon
request.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses from The House Price shock (Baseline Model)
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Notes: Impulse responses form a housing price shock on Tradable (T) employment, using
the penalty function approach in the sign-restriction method for baseline model. The
results for the rest of states are not reported to conserve space but available upon request.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Responses for T and NT
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Notes: The graphs show the median impulse responses of Tradable and Non-Tradable to a
housing price shock.
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Figure 3.6: Impulse Responses for NT: MT Approach
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Notes: The graphs show the estimated MT and the penalty function for Non-Tradable
(NT). The results for the rest of states are not reported to conserve space but available
upon request.
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Figure 3.7: Impulse Responses for T: MT Approach
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Notes: The graphs show the estimated MT and the penalty function for Tradable (T). The
results for the rest of states are not reported to conserve space but available upon request.
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Figure 3.8: Impulse Responses for Wage
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Notes: The graphs show the estimated impulse responses of wage to a positive house price
shock. The results for the rest of states are not reported to conserve space but available
upon request.
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3.7 Appendix
Figure 3.7.1: Impulse Responses for Four variables
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
6
0.
00
8
0.
01
0
Impulse Response
a
la
ba
m
a
NT
T
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
0.
00
2
0.
00
3
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
0.
00
6
Impulse Response
a
la
sk
a
NT
T
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.
00
0
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
6
0.
00
8
0.
01
0
Impulse Response
a
riz
o
n
a
NT
T
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.
00
05
0.
00
15
0.
00
25
Impulse Response
a
rk
an
sa
s
NT
T
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
6
0.
00
8
0.
01
0
Impulse Response
ca
lifo
rn
ia
NT
T
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.
00
0
0.
00
5
0.
01
0
0.
01
5
Impulse Response
co
lo
ra
do
NT
T
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.
00
1
0.
00
2
0.
00
3
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
0.
00
6
0.
00
7
Impulse Response
co
n
n
e
ct
ic
ut
NT
T
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.
00
0
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
6
0.
00
8
Impulse Response
flo
rid
a
NT
T
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.
00
0
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
6
0.
00
8
0.
01
0
Impulse Response
ge
or
gi
a
NT
T
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
6
0.
00
8
0.
01
0
0.
01
2
Impulse Response
id
ah
o
NT
T
Notes: The graphs show the impulses responses for Tradable and Non-Tradable to the
house price shock, when we remove income (I) from our baseline model.
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Chapter 4
Expectation of Future Income Growth and Housing
Return: Evidence from the Present-Value Model
4.1 Introduction
The housing market, through the wealth effect, can impact a household’s spending and
thus, most homeowners consider the housing market as one way to invest. The recession
of 2000 was followed by a collapse in the stock market, during which house prices
rose and aggregate consumption did not decrease. This led to considering the housing
market an alternative for investment. Also, negative shocks from the housing market
during 2006-2009 led to a run on the shadow banking system and a large decline in real
economic activities.1 Because the housing market was at the center of the financial turmoil,
understanding the housing market’s fluctuations is a central goal for many researchers,
policy-makers, and regulators.
What factors explain the fluctuations of the housing market? Looking at the house
price growth is often the first step to understanding whether house prices are high enough.
The problem with the price index is that it cannot be used to compare price levels across
countries and also does not show whether fundamental factors or a price bubble are
the reasons behind price fluctuations. The second factor is the house price-to-rent ratio,
1See Gorton (2009)
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which reflects the relative costs of buying a house versus renting. The price-to-rent index
cannot explain the boom and bust across countries because it is not standardized to the
same representative apartment. Furthermore, there is a data limitation across countries.2
The house price-to-income ratio method is commonly used as an appropriate first step in
housing affordability assessment to generally identify the housing market fluctuations and
capture the common trends of the housing market. For each country, this indicator can
explain housing costs relative to the ability to pay. The relationship between house prices
and income has been used widely to explain housing market dynamics, and the fluctuation
of those can help to determine bubbles.
The focus of this paper is using information on the price-income ratio to explain the
movements in housing market in 21 OECD countries. I use the present value model for the
house price-income ratio to explain the household’s expectations about future real price
growth and future real income growth. This is based on the assumption that movements
in price-income ratio reflects forward-looking agent’s expectation about future movements
in income growth and housing return. The idea of the present-value model for asset price
goes back to Campbell and Shiller (1988a), and it has been applied in the housing market.
3 The present-value model implies that the log of housing prices to income ratio can
be equaled to the expected discounted sum of the future income growth and the future
housing price growth.
In the housing literature, the VAR model and co-integration are commonly applied
when examining the long-run relationship between house price growth and income growth
by using information from the price-income ratio. While the present value of price-
income ratio is not stationary and the house price growth and the income growth are
stationary 4, using VAR models is not suitable to capture the role of expected income
growth and the housing returns or the movements in price-income ratio.5 By modifying
the present value model that includes a non-stationary component, we can capture
2 SeeHimmelberg et al. (2005) for the problems associated with the price-rent ratio and price index.
3Campbell and Shiller (1988a) explains that in the finance literature, this model is the dynamic version
of the Gordon growth model.(Campbell et al., 2009)
4See Table 1
5Abraham and Hendershott (1994), Malpezzi (1999), Capozza et al. (2002), Meen (2002) assumes that
house prices and fundamentals are co-integrated, while Poterba et al. (1991) implicitly assume that they are
not.
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features such as transaction cost, differential tax, and differential regulation structure
can be captured. To decompose the present value of the house price-income ratio, an
unobserved component model is used that Kishor and Morley (2015) suggests to capture
non-stationary components, expected income growth, and expected housing returns.
The results from the state space model suggest that the expected house price growth is
more persistent than the expected income growth for all countries except for Spain. The
results are consistent with Binsbergen et al. (2010), Kishor and Morley (2015), and Pástor
and Stambaugh (2009), who have found the expected asset return is highly persistent.
I find that the standard deviation of the shock to the non-stationary is larger than the
standard deviation of the shock to the expected income growth and housing returns. Also,
the results show a positive correlation between expected housing returns and income
growth across all countries except Australia. These results are consistent with Abraham
and Hendershott (1994), Malpezzi (1999), Capozza et al. (2002), Meen (2002). In
addition, the correlation between expected housing return and non-stationary components
is positive and high, which can be explained by different regulations across all countries.
This paper is related to a number of studies on the relationship between the housing
markets and fundamental factors. A series of empirical studies by Mian and Sufi
(2009, 2011, 2012) and Mian et al. (2013) show the impact of the housing market
on macroeconomic expenditures during the recent financial crisis. Lai and Van Order
(2010), Wang and Brand (2015), and Gallin (2006) show the relationship between
income and house prices by using information from price-income ratios. Abraham and
Hendershott (1994), Malpezzi (1999), Capozza et al. (2002), Meen (2003), and Gallin
(2003) consider the long-run relationship between house prices and income by estimating
an error-correction specification.
In the finance literature,it is common to use the present value model to explain
households’ expectations about the future.6 Campbell and Shiller (1988a,b) use this
approach to estimate housing returns. In this paper, I use the present value model for
the house price-income ratio to specify future income growth and housing returns. This
6The present value model is widely used in asset markets. For example, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005);
Campbell and Ammer (1993); Shiller and Beltratti (1992); Vuolteenaho (2002)
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paper is related to Kishor and Morley (2015) that used the state-space model to modify the
present-value model of the price-rent ratio for the housing market in 18 U.S. metropolitan
areas.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, a modified present-
value model is presented. Section 3 describes the data and discusses the empirical results.
Section 4 provides a conclusion.
4.2 Model Specification
4.2.1 Modified Present-value Model
The present-value model for asset prices has been used commonly in the finance literature
to study the behavior of equity markets. The present value model of the price income is:
pt − yt = k/(1− ρ) +
∞∑
i=0
ρi−1Et(4yt+j −4pt+i) (4.1)
The present price-income ratio explains a household’s expectations about future house
price growth and future income growth. As expected, income growth and expected price
growth are stationary, while the price-income ratio should be stationary. Table 1 shows
that the expected income growth and expected price growth are stationary, while the price-
income ratio has unit roots. Kishor and Morley (2015) suggest a modified present-value
model of the housing markets to capture non-stationary components. Transaction cost,
differential tax, and differential regulation structure for each country can be explained by
non-stationary factors.
Based on the modified present-value model, I decompose the price-income ratio into
the current expected income growth and expected price growth, which are stationary, and
a residual component(Z), which is non-stationary. By applying an unobserved component
approach, I assume that expected income growth and expected price growth are AR(1)
and the non-stationary component (Z) is a random walk. In this model, expected income
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growth, expected housing return, and Z component are talent variables, while information
is used from past realized income growth, realized housing return, and price-income ratio.
A modified present-value model of Campbell and Shiller (1988a) for the price-income
can be written as:
pt − yt = M + γ14yet + γ14pet + Zt (4.2)
where pf − rt as the log price-income ratio,4ret represents the expected income growth,
4pet is the expected price growth, and Zt is the non-stationary component.
To estimate a modified present-value model, I develop an unobserved component
approach for multi variables. I define three measurement equations such as:
pt − yt = µ+ γ14yet + γ24pet + Zt (4.3)
4yt+1 = 4yet + εyt+1 (4.4)
4pt+1 = 4pet + εpt+1 (4.5)
As suggested by Cochrane (2008), I need to impose restrictions on the covariance structure
in the above state space model to achieve identification. I follow Binsbergen et al. (2010)’s
identification strategy and assume that covariance between shocks to realized variables are
uncorrelated with the shocks to unobserved state variables. The measurement equation
has the following variance-covariance matrix:
R =

0 0 0
0 σ2y σyp
0 σyp σ
2
p

Three transition equations are specified as the expected real income growth and the
expected real price growth are AR(1), while the present-value residual is a random walk
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specification.
4yet = δ1 + β14yet−1 + εy
e
t (4.6)
4pet = δ2 + β24pet−1 + εp
e
t (4.7)
Zt+1 = γ3 + Zt + ε
Z
t (4.8)
The transition equation has the following variance-covariance matrix:
Q =

σ2ye σyepe σyez
σyepe σ
2
pe σpez
σyez σpez σ
2
z

To estimate this state space model, I adopt the Kalman Filter simulation.
4.2.2 Variance Decomposition of the present-value level
It is important to explain what moves the price-income ratios in the housing market. One
way to do that is to use a variance decomposition of the present value level of price-income
ratio for equation(2):
var(p∗t − y∗t ) = γ21var(4yet ) + γ22var(4pet ) + 2γ1γ2cov(4yet ,4pet ) (4.9)
The variation of the present-value level of the price-income ratio p∗t − y∗t is explained by
expected real income growth (γ21var(4yet )), and the percentage of variation is explained
by the expected housing price growth(γ22var(4pet )).
4.3 Data and Empirical Results
4.3.1 Data
I use quarterly data for 21 countries and sample runs from 1975:Q1 through 2015:Q1.
The data on the housing price index expressed in real terms (RHPI) and the personal
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disposable income expressed in real terms (RPDI) index are from the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, Texas. For each country, the housing price index is consistent with the
quarterly U.S. housing price index for existing single-family houses.7 All variables in real
terms are deflated with the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflater. Figures 1,2,
and 3 present the trend of these variables. After being seasonally adjusted, I calculate the
price-income ratio for my model. Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the trend of the price-income
ratio for 21 countries.
4.3.2 Empirical results
As a first step, I test whether the price-income ratio has satisfied a unit root test. Table 1
suggests that the price-income ratio is not stationary, while the realized income growth and
realized price growth are stationary for all countries.These results support my assumption
for a modified present value model of price-income ratio.
I estimate the modified present-value model by using the Kalman Filter for a state-space
model. My results of parameter estimations for equation(2)-(5) are reported in Tables 2,
3, and 4. The results of drift show that δ1 for all countries is positive, with δ2 for Japan,
Italy, Spain, Germany being negative, δ3 for S. Africa, Luxembourg, Japan, Italy, Finland,
Switzerland, and Belgium being positive. The results from the parameter(AR coefficient
β) suggest that expected real income growth is less persistent than the expected housing
price growth.
Table 2 shows that the measurement coefficient γ2 is negative, while the γ1 for all
countries is positive. These results suggest that an increase in expected real income growth
leads to a price-income ratio increase, and an increase at expected housing price causes an
increase in the price-income ratio.
The results of the standard deviations of expected income growth σye, expected price
growth σpe and the Z component σz are presented in Table 3. According to these results,
the standard deviation of shocks to the Z component is larger than the standard deviation
of the expected housing price growth and the expected income growth. The standard
7 A detailed description of the sources and methodology for this data can be found in Mack et al. (2011)
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deviation of shock to the realized price growth is higher than the realized income growth,
yet the standard deviation of shock to the realized price growth is less than the realized
income price for Italy and New Zealand.
The results of the correlation between expected income growth and expected price
growth are presented in Table 4. For all countries except Australia and South Africa,
the correlation between expected income and price (ρyepe ) is positive. These results are
expected because a shock to the expected income growth increases the expected price
growth. The result for France shows that the correlation is high where the expected
price growth increased, while at the same time, the expected income growth increased.
For other countries,the results suggest that the expected price growth will increase when
income increases, but not at same time or close to it. The results also show there is a
positive correlation between expected price growth and the residual component. France
has the highest correlation, while Japan has the lowest. I also find the correlation between
expected income growth and the residual component is positive for Switzerland, France,
UK,Italy, Japan,South Korea, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand and Sweden. The results
suggest that the correlation between realized income and price growth is positive for all
countries except Australia, Switzerland, Denmark, Japan and South Africa.
To understand which component has a more important role in the price-income ratio,
I perform a variance decomposition. Table 5 and 6 present results for the variance
decomposition test. The findings suggest that most of the variation in the present-value
component is explained by expected price growth for all countries. Australia and South
Africa have the highest shares of income among all countries, which is about 11%. My
results also show that shares of the expected house price growth for most countries is
higher than 100%, except for Australia, Belgium, Canada, Spain, France, Ireland, US and
South Africa, which are close to 100%. For countries in which this share is higher than
100%, the negative share of the covariance diminishes the overall variation in the price-
income ratio.
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4.3.3 Robustness Check
In this part, I use a robustness check to identify the structure of my model. I define five
models and then compare their log likelihood. First, if I have no correlation between
expected income and price growth and residual components, then there is no correlation
between realized income and price growth. Second, there is only a correlation between
realized price and income growth. Third, there is a correlation between realized income
and price growth and a correlation between expected income and price growth. Fourth,
I do not have a correlation between realized income and price growth. Finally, if I define
the baseline model, which considers the correlation between realized income and price
growth, there is an expected correlation between income and price growth. Table 7 shows
the robustness results, which reveal that for all countries, the baseline model has a higher
log likelihood than the other models. The robustness test suggests the baseline model is
much better than the other models.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper, by using the state space model, I modified the present-value model to
consider the price-income ratio as a metric of affordability indicator for 21 OECD countries.
I explained that the price-income ratio may move due to a change in expected income and
price growth, which are stationary, and the residual component, which is non-stationary.
I find that both expected income growth and expected price growth are significant
in explaining movements in the price-income ratio. In addition, I find that the residual
component that may explain the regulation and structural feature of the housing market is
also significant, while for all countries, there is a significant heterogeneity. My findings
suggest that the correlation between expected income and the residual component is
positive for all countries. I also use variance decomposition, which shows the share of
price is higher than 100%, while my results from the share of correlation are negative. I
also present a robustness check to identify the correlation between expected income, price
growth and the residual component, as well as for the correlation between realized income
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and price. My results show that when I consider all correlations, I will have a higher log
likelihood.
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Table 4.4.1: Unit Root Test
ADF PP
Ratio(price-Income) ∆yt ∆pt Ratio(price-Income) ∆yt ∆pt
Australia 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.01 0.01
Belgium 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.01 0.13
Canada 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.01 0.01
Switzerland 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.01 0.07
Germany 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.01 0.01
Denmark 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.01 0.01
Spain 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.01 0.01
Finland 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.01 0.01
France 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.01 0.01
UK 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.01 0.01
Ireland 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.02 0.07
Italy 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Japan 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.01 0.04
S. Korea 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.01 0.01
Luxembourg 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.01 0.01
Netherlands 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.01 0.01
Norway 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.01 0.01
New Zealand 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.01
Sweden 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.01 0.01
US 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.01 0.01
S. Africa 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.01 0.01
Note: ∆yt and ∆pt represent the real income growth and the real price growth
respectively. ADF and PP also represent the Argument Dicky Fuller’s and Phillips-Peron’s
tests.
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Table 4.4.2: Parameter Estimation
countries δ1 δ2 β1 β2 γ1 γ2
Australia 0.0494 -0.0678 0.3236 0.5884 0.2977 -0.3863
0.0685 0.0258 0.0761 0.0713 0.0462 0.0321
Belgium -0.0373 -0.0336 0.6867 0.9057 0.1413 -0.6448
0.0535 0.0146 0.0557 0.0326 0.0145 0.2010
Canada -0.0019 -0.0366 -0.2181 0.5939 -0.3209 -0.6729
0.0619 0.0172 0.0759 0.0680 0.1336 0.0551
Switzerland 0.0179 0.0096 0.7186 0.8916 0.1558 -0.8141
0.0449 0.0076 0.0637 0.0304 0.0285 0.2017
Germany -0.0332 0.1312 0.0700 0.6533 0.5558 -0.1482
0.0839 0.0343 0.0548 0.0586 0.4040 0.0118
Denmark -0.0094 -0.0146 0.2460 0.6090 0.2619 -0.6207
0.0718 0.0140 0.0755 0.0627 0.0536 0.0379
Spain 0.0047 0.0492 0.6450 0.3693 0.1182 -0.7090
0.0575 0.0261 0.1019 0.0823 0.0306 0.0692
Finland -0.0010 0.0063 0.3457 0.7417 0.4176 -0.8229
0.0651 0.0141 0.0727 0.0451 0.0457 0.0947
France 0.0027 -0.0358 0.1653 0.7975 0.2939 -0.4500
0.1153 0.0162 0.0949 0.0508 0.1319 0.0852
UK -0.0083 -0.0362 0.7092 0.7300 -0.1405 -0.4083
0.0190 0.0112 0.1081 0.0526 0.1294 0.0811
Ireland 0.0108 -0.0075 0.8651 0.9216 0.2664 -1.2207
0.0377 0.0085 0.0375 0.0348 0.0647 0.4893
Italy -0.0144 0.0284 0.2679 0.6386 0.3778 -0.7389
0.0736 0.0179 0.0722 0.0549 0.0644 0.0563
Japan -0.0085 0.0348 0.4770 0.9157 0.1203 -0.6069
0.1173 0.0167 0.0715 0.0314 0.0062 0.2031
S. Korea 0.0145 0.1239 0.5816 0.6825 0.1292 -0.1954
0.0613 0.0339 0.0702 0.0555 0.0073 0.0183
Luxembourg 0.0105 -0.0498 0.6200 0.7090 0.2355 -0.4063
0.0553 0.0276 0.0694 0.0525 0.0164 0.0438
Netherlands -0.0062 -0.0407 0.2681 0.6721 0.2257 -0.4504
0.0937 0.0213 0.0680 0.0604 0.0368 0.0399
Norway -0.0130 -0.0057 0.1866 0.4349 0.5244 -0.6216
0.0682 0.0217 0.0798 0.0707 0.1777 0.0255
New Zealand 0.0085 -0.0276 0.5837 0.7701 0.2240 -0.5411
0.0583 0.0180 0.0564 0.0367 0.0090 0.0595
Sweden -0.0016 -0.0019 0.7138 0.8622 0.2223 -0.9024
0.0490 0.0092 0.0710 0.0375 0.0388 0.2065
US -0.0212 0.0130 0.2289 0.8304 0.5216 -0.8548
0.0687 0.0105 0.0797 0.0479 0.1389 0.2030
S. Africa -0.0055 -0.0019 0.6407 0.8359 0.4280 -0.9530
0.0550 0.0161 0.0605 0.0622 0.0355 0.3305
Note: ye and pe refer to expected real income growth, and expected housing
price growth and Z is the deviation from the present-value components.δ1,
δ2 and δ3 are constant in AR(1). β1 and β2 are coefficients in AR(1),γ1 and
γ2 refer to the estimated coefficients of the measurement equation.
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Table 4.4.3: Parameter estimation
countries σye σpe σz σy σp
Australia 0.0075 0.0149 0.0723 0.0001 0.0076
0.000419 0.002027 0.010069 0.00051 0.0026
Belgium 0.0065 0.0064 0.0678 0.0017 0.0018
0.0004 0.0006 0.0105 0.0004 0.0010
Canada 0.0104 0.0176 0.0571 0.0013 0.0055
0.0006 0.0018 0.0079 0.0018 0.0042
Switzerland 0.0041 0.0055 0.0408 0.0001 0.0007
0.0003 0.0034 0.0116 0 .0001 0.0006
Germany 0.0072 0.0033 0.0495 0.0023 0.0042
0.0005 0.0006 0.0102 0.0008 0.0005
Denmark 0.0054 0.0215 0.0551 0.0087 0.0008
0.0015 0.0012 0.0088 0.0010 0.0024
Spain 0.0056 0.0344 0.0780 0.0007 0.0205
0.0003 0.0054 0.0107 0.0006 0.0072
Finland 0.0065 0.0104 0.0632 0.0104 0.0083
0.0010 0.0012 0.0171 0.0007 0.0010
France 0.0076 0.0054 0.0612 0.0010 0.0048
0.0004 0.0006 0.0197 0.0008 0.0005
UK 0.0077 0.0147 0.0712 0.0001 0.0049
0.0004 0.0014 0.0134 0.0001 0.0022
Ireland 0.0037 0.0098 0.0916 0.0002 0.0051
0.0002 0.0010 0.0308 0.0001 0.0011
Italy 0.0093 0.0187 0.0531 0.0044 0.0025
0.0008 0.0011 0.0081 0.0012 0.0018
Japan 0.0041 0.0044 0.0633 0.0001 0.0017
0.0002 0.0004 0.0065 0.0001 0.0005
S. Korea 0.0128 0.0149 0.1227 0.0066 0.0104
0.0010 0.0024 0.0125 0.0013 0.0024
Luxembourg 0.0097 0.0088 0.0508 0.0014 0.0074
0.0005 0.0010 0.0084 0.0005 0.0009
Netherlands 0.0106 0.0087 0.1098 0.0051 0.0123
0.0009 0.0012 0.0340 0.0015 0.0010
Norway 0.0011 0.0218 0.0378 0.0109 0.0108
0.0005 0.0012 0.0027 0.0006 0.0006
New Zealand 0.0096 0.0133 0.0601 0.0018 0.0006
0.0005 0.0007 0.0103 0.0010 0.0016
Sweden 0.0071 0.0092 0.0679 0.0001 0.0057
0.00403 0.0072 0.0228 0.0001 0.0006
US 0.0052 0.0045 0.0393 0.0002 0.0049
0.0002 0.0006 0.0050 0.0002 0.0005
S. Africa 0.0019 0.0188 0.0599 0.0072 0.0090
0.0007 0.0010 0.0114 0.0005 0.0009
Note: ye and pe refer to expected real income growth, and expected
housing price growth and z is the deviation from the present-value
components. δ1, δ2 and δ3 are constant in AR(1). β1 and β2 are
coefficients in AR(1) ,γ1 and γ2 refer to the estimated coefficients of
the measurement equation.
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Table 4.4.4: Correlation Estimation
countries ρyepe ρyez ρpez ρyp
Australia -0.0900 -0.4194 0.9331 0.9854
0.0959 0.0926 0.0270 0.8670
Belgium 0.5747 0.3551 0.9690 0.9997
0.0629 0.1180 0.0240 0.0297
Canada 0.1952 -0.0314 0.9568 0.9999
0.0913 0.0953 0.0174 0.0023
Switzerland 0.4441 0.2292 0.9730 0.0001
0.0737 0.1081 0.0183 0.0000
Germany 0.2912 -0.1820 0.8876 0.0002
0.0723 0.1158 0.0444 0.0000
Denmark 0.1296 -0.0877 0.9726 0.0307
0.0786 0.0897 0.0108 0.0000
Spain 0.0891 -0.1856 0.9621 0.9982
0.0896 0.1097 0.0215 0.0488
Finland 0.5342 0.2497 0.9519 -0.0461
0.0599 0.0935 0.0208 0.0000
France 0.1143 -0.0865 0.9798 0.9484
0.0874 0.0924 0.0111 0.0000
UK 0.8925 0.7745 0.9765 0.0725
0.0919 0.1410 0.0116 0.0000
Ireland 0.1906 -0.0686 0.9662 1.0000
0.0923 0.1652 0.0345 0.0000
Italy 0.3770 0.1022 0.9534 0.0223
0.0668 0.0865 0.0180 0.0000
Japan 0.1406 -0.0542 0.9801 0.9999
0.0938 0.1090 0.0157 0.0012
S. Korea 0.5443 0.1324 0.9035 0.0233
0.0722 0.1432 0.0466 0.0000
Luxembourg 0.1973 -0.3656 0.8403 0.0000
0.0805 0.1353 0.0756 0.0000
Netherlands 0.2405 -0.0418 0.9597 0.9996
0.0651 0.0580 0.0158 0.0000
Norway 0.1638 -0.1704 0.9441 0.0000
0.0827 0.0898 0.0186 0.0000
New Zealand 0.4110 0.0050 0.9136 0.0000
0.0571 0.0000 0.0226 0.0000
Sweden 0.4743 0.2680 0.9752 0.9997
0.1002 0.1286 0.0171 0.0371
US 0.1731 -0.0662 0.9712 0.3563
0.1001 0.1067 0.0160 0.0000
S. Africa 0.0132 -0.3406 0.9228 0.9999
0.1248 0.1265 0.0530 0.0000
Note: ρyepe, ρyez and ρpez refer to the correlation
between expected real income growth and expected
price growth, expected real income and residual
component, and price growth and the residual
component respectively. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 4.4.5: Share of unobserved components
countries share of income share of price share of covariance
Australia 0.1311 0.8699 -0.0011
Belgium 0.0148 0.9815 0.0035
Canada 0.0260 0.9728 0.0010
Switzerland 0.0152 0.9806 0.0040
Germany 0.1021 0.8973 0.0004
Denmark 0.0229 0.9763 0.0007
Spain 0.0961 0.9030 0.0007
Finland 0.0391 0.9489 0.0119
France 0.0105 0.9892 0.0002
UK 0.0402 0.9552 0.0044
Ireland 0.0302 0.9630 0.0066
Italy 0.0361 0.9587 0.0050
Japan 0.0050 0.9946 0.0002
S. Korea 0.1812 0.8155 0.0032
Luxembourg 0.1961 0.7991 0.0047
Netherlands 0.0307 0.9681 0.0010
Norway 0.0988 0.8989 0.0022
New Zealand 0.0750 0.9174 0.0075
Sweden 0.0254 0.9655 0.0090
US 0.0162 0.9820 0.0016
S. Africa 0.0796 0.9194 0.0009
Note: In this table we present the share explained by expected income,
price growth from the variance decomposition.
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Table 4.4.6: Log likelihood value for alternative model specification
countries Zero correlation ρyp 6= 0 ρyepe 6= 0 and ρyp 6= 0 ρyp = 0 Baseline Model
Australia 1206.418 1206.64 1206.67 1215.05 1215.09
Belgium 1379.16 1379.37 1404.90 1411.16 1412.02
Canada 1210.51 1213.16 1213.40 1244.64 1244.90
Switzerland 1710.59 1713.04 1729.38 1794.40 1794.79
Germany 1434.40 1442.56 1443.54 1445.57 1448.71
Denmark 1249.90 1250.05 1251.08 1377.18 1377.19
Spain 1120.66 1121.03 1122.25 1157.15 1157.97
Finland 1337.52 1365.81 1365.83 1503.59 1512.24
France 1419.36 1419.79 1419.95 1431.23 1431.76
UK 1268.69 1272.18 1276.00 1303.10 1303.39
Ireland 1435.78 1436.13 1437.13 1450.00 1452.43
Italy 1221.94 1233.24 1233.78 1262.88 1265.91
Japan 1490.62 1492.11 1496.15 1496.54 1496.77
S. Korea 973.15 982.35 987.80 988.66 991.02
Luxembourg 1261.09 1264.18 1264.39 1268.17 1270.82
Netherlands 1171.38 1171.39 1177.70 1196.89 1196.97
Norway 1240.19 1245.60 1250.13 1282.49 1287.75
New Zealand 1270.97 1275.70 1287.73 1308.45 1308.48
Sweden 1470.11 1472.52 1474.12 1670.07 1670.92
US 1608.01 1609.98 1610.00 1644.49 1645.20
S. Africa 1330.70 1331.02 1331.39 1413.80 1415.80
Note: Robustness results for identify model
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Figure 4.4.1: Income Growth
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Figure 4.4.2: Housing Price Growth
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Figure 4.4.3: Price-Income Ratio
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Figure 4.4.4: Deviation from the present-value level
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4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Modified Present-Value Model
We decompose the price-income ratio into the present-value of expected income growth,
the present-value of expected housing price growth, and a non-stationary component(Z).
pt − yt = µ+
∞∑
i=0
Et(4yt+j −4pt+i) + Zt (4.10)
We assume that the expected house price and expected income growth are latent
variabels and there is a non-stationary deviation from the long run stationary value of
price-income ratio which contain the future expected housing price, the future expected
income growth, and a non-stationary residuals term. We assume the expected price growth
and expected income growth as AR(1) processes, while the Z component follows a random
walk process.
4yet+1 = δ1 + β14yet + εy
e
t+1, ε
ye
t+1 iidN(0, σ
2
ye) (4.11)
4pet+1 = δ2 + β24yet + εp
e
t+1, ε
pe
t+1 iidN(0, σ
2
pe) (4.12)
zt+1 = δ3 + zt + ε
z
t+1, ε
z
t+1 iidN(0, σ
2
z) (4.13)
where
4yet = Et[4yt−1]
4pet = Et[4pt−1]
To get modified present-value model, we define the relationship between the realized real
income growth and realized housing price growth such as:
4yt+1 = 4yet + εyt+1 (4.14)
4pt+1 = 4pet + εpt+1 (4.15)
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Based on our definition, εyt+1 and ε
p
t+1 are an idiosyncratic shock. Plugging Eqs. 3-7 in 2
and solving, we get:
pt − yt = A+B14yet +B24pet + zt (4.16)
where A = µ+(γ1 ∗ δ1)+(δ2 ∗γ2) , B1 = δ1 ∗β1 and B2 = δ2 ∗β2. Equation 9 is the modified
present-value model for housing market, which determined the log price-income ratio is
linear in the expected real income growth yet , expected real housing price growth p
e
t , and
the residual term prvt. There are five shocks in the model, a shock to expected real income
growth (εy
e
t+1), a shock to expected real housing price growth (ε
pe
t+1), a shock to the PVR
component (εpvr
e
t+1 ), a shock to realized income growth (ε
y
t+1), and a shock to the realized
housing price (εpt+1). We use a state space approach for the present-value model, where
the measurement equation can be written as:

pt − yt
δyt+1
δpt+1
 =

A
0
0
+

1 B1 B2
0 1 0
0 0 1


Zt
δyt
δpt
+

0
εyt
εpt

and the transition equation is represented as:

δyet
δpet
Zt
 =

δ1
δ2
0
+

β1 0 0
0 β2 0
0 0 1


δyet1
δpet1
Zt−1
+

εy
e
t
εp
e
t
εzt

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